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ESSAY
THE RESTORATION REMEDY IN PRIVATE LAW
Omri Ben-Shahar * & Ariel Porat **
One of the most perplexing problems in private law is when and how
to compensate victims for emotional harm. This Essay proposes a novel
way to accomplish this remedial goal—a restoration measure of damages.
It solves the two fundamental problems of compensation for emotional
harm—measurement and verification. Instead of measuring the emotional harm and awarding the aggrieved party money damages, this
Essay proposes that defendants pay damages directly to restore the
underlying interest, the impairment of which led to the emotional harm.
And to solve the problem of veriﬁcation—compensating only those who
truly suffered the emotional harm—this Essay develops a sorting mechanism that separates sincere claimants from fakers, awarding the restoration measure of damages to account only for the harm suffered by the
former. This Essay further demonstrates how the proposed restoration
remedy would apply in important cases and discusses its relevance to
additional remedial challenges in private law.
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INTRODUCTION
Private law does not eye claims of emotional harm generously.1 It is
deeply puzzling why. We live in a society in which emotional interests like
dignity, privacy, personal fulﬁllment, and reputation are central to individual wellbeing, in which people are willing to pay nicely for emotional
beneﬁts, and in which many institutions are focused on advancing and
protecting people’s emotional concerns. Public law and private norms

1. This Essay uses the term “emotional harm” broadly to refer to all types of harms
that are not physical and pecuniary, without distinguishing different types of emotional
harms. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90
Marq. L. Rev. 789, 838 (2007) (categorizing the role of emotional distress in different
areas of tort law); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 136, 140–46 (1992)
(chronicling the growth of emotional distress liability); Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the
Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 935, 940–46 (1992) (same).
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show increasing respect for emotional interests, and yet private law is
lagging behind.2
A primary reason for this misalignment is the absence of a conceptually coherent private law remedy for emotional harm. Deciding how to
hold wrongdoers accountable for the emotional harms that their actions
inﬂict on others presents one of the most perplexing challenges in private law. Unlike pecuniary or physical harms, emotional distress is difficult to verify and measure, and the remedial tools of private law—money
damages or injunctions—are often ill-suited to redress it. Private law
needs a new remedy to redress emotional harms that other areas of law
regard as protection-worthy. This Essay aims to develop such a remedy,
which we call “restoration.”
The notorious Volkswagen “dieselgate” case illustrates the hurdles in
awarding damages for emotional harms. From 2009 to 2015, Volkswagen
sold nearly 500,000 vehicles in the United States, which it branded as
“clean diesel” and marketed as environmentally friendly.3 In fact, these
vehicles emitted toxic gases at high rates.4 An antidetection “defeat
device” built into the vehicles, which allowed the cars to pass regulatory
emissions tests with ﬂying colors, made this deception possible. Speciﬁcally, Volkswagen programmed this device to produce low-emission
results when it sensed the vehicle was in an emission testing facility. Elsewhere, under normal driving circumstances, the device allowed the vehicle to release emissions at a higher rate.5 Volkswagen brandished these
“certiﬁed” low emissions to environmentally eager car buyers, hiding the
fact that these vehicles emitted nitrogen oxides up to forty times over the
permitted limit.6
Ultimately, the fraud was detected and litigation ensued. The price
of the cars, new or used, dropped.7 Aggrieved car owners joined hundreds of class action lawsuits alleging breach of contract and related

2. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily allowed.”); Whaley, supra note 1, at 940–
47 (describing tort law and contract law suspicions toward emotional harms); Eugene
Kontorovich, Comment, The Mitigation of Emotional Distress Damages, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
491, 493 (2001) (discussing how courts gradually began to recognize liability for emotional
distress, and the resulting challenges).
3. See Order Granting Final Approval of the 2.0-Liter TDI Consumer and Reseller
Dealership Class Action Settlement at 2, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales
Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2671 CRM (JSC) (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Volkswagen Settlement], https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/2867/OrderGranting-Final-Approval-of-Consumer-Sett.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EEV-9PLC].
4. Id. (“In reality, these vehicles emit nitrogen oxides . . . at a factor of up to 40
times over the permitted limit.”).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 19 (explaining that the amount of cash each Class Member is to receive
depends on the loss of value to the vehicle she owns).
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causes of action.8 These cases were consolidated into a single multidistrict litigation in a federal court in California and eventually settled.9 The
settlement awarded the class members damages for their pecuniary losses,
measured by the decline in the cars’ market value.10
Courts in breach of contract cases don’t often grant damages for
emotional harm,11 but the Volkswagen settlement seemed to recognize the
centrality of the buyers’ environmental concerns by allowing for an additional recovery—a uniform payment of several thousand dollars for each
car buyer.12 This solution is problematic for two reasons. First, car owners
who did not care about the environment suffered no emotional harm
and yet were able to fake their way to recovery. We call this the problem
of veriﬁcation. Second, those who did suffer emotional harm received an
arbitrary award that bore no measurable link to the gravity of their harm.
We call this the problem of measurement.
To solve the veriﬁcation and measurement problems of emotional
damages, this Essay proposes a novel restoration measure of damages remedy
(“restoration damages”). Under the proposed remedy, the wrongdoer is
not required to compensate the emotionally aggrieved parties directly or
undo the emotional harm. Instead, the wrongdoer has to restore the
underlying interest that was impaired and gave rise to the emotional harm.
The underlying interest is the aggrieved party’s plan, agenda, values, or
set of preferences that the wrongdoer was obligated to promote or protect. The court has to identify this interest and devise a remedy that enables the wrongdoer to restore it.
The Volkswagen case illustrates how restoration damages differ from
emotional damages. Under the restoration remedy, Volkswagen would
not be required to pay the buyers directly. Because the underlying interest is environmental, a court would order Volkswagen to pay for environmental improvements offsetting the emissions that its breach caused. For
example, it could order Volkswagen to purchase and set aside carbon
allowances equivalent to the pollutants emitted by each car. Buyers would
thus experience a reprieve: Volkswagen’s reduced emissions would
precisely restore the environmental objective that led them to purchase
the cars.
Restoration damages address the two fundamental challenges of
compensation for emotional harm—measurement and verification—

8. Id. at 2 (“Consumers nationwide ﬁled hundreds of lawsuits after Volkswagen’s use
of the defeat device became public . . . .”).
9. See id. at 2–5.
10. Id. at 19.
11. See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
12. Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 20 (“Restitution, which Class Members
receive in addition to either a Buyback or Lease Termination or a Fix, provides additional
monetary compensation.”).
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better than any other existing remedy.13 The ﬁrst major contribution of
this Essay is to solve the problem of measurement. Restoration damages
are not paid to the plaintiffs directly but are directed instead to restore
the reparable underlying interest. Thus, they solve the problem of
measurement because they do not require the impossible—the
quantiﬁcation and monetization of emotional harm. They do not need
an “exchange rate” to translate agony into dollars.
The problem of veriﬁcation is more difficult to solve. Unlike physical
harms, claims of emotional harm are easy to fake and hard to verify.
Because restoration damages provide meaningful redress only to sincere
plaintiffs who truly suffered emotional distress, they are of no use to
fakers. In our Volkswagen example, requiring the breaching seller to purchase carbon allowances provides a beneﬁt only to “green” car buyers.
Nevertheless, fakers may seek restoration damages strategically to bargain
for high monetary settlements. While such Coasian bargaining would
safeguard against wasteful investment in restoration, it would still lead to
excessive compensation and deterrence. To that end, this Essay’s second
major contribution is developing a general sorting mechanism that overcomes the faking problem. It describes how to design an election-of-remedy regime that awards restoration damages only to sincere claimants by
screening away fakers with small cash bounties.14 This regime would also
allow defendants to invest less in inefficient restoration targeting plaintiffs who suffered only mild emotional harm.
In its simplest form, the sorting mechanism offers plaintiffs two
choices: a restoration remedy paid directly to repair the underlying interest, or a “small” sum of money damages paid to the plaintiff’s pocket.
Sincere plaintiffs would choose the ﬁrst option because they truly care
about the underlying interest; fakers would choose the second. In reality,
the mechanism may have to be more complex and award more than a
trivial bounty to some plaintiffs to account for varying degrees of concern
for the underlying interest. This Essay discusses ways to mitigate this
complexity.
13. For a comparison of the restoration remedy with traditional damage remedies,
see infra text accompanying notes 63–65. For a comparison with other remedial damages
doctrines, see infra section II.E.
14. In a paper written at the same time as this Essay, Nathan Atkinson developed a
self-selection mechanism to address a similar sorting problem. See Nathan Atkinson,
Designing Remedies to Compensate Plaintiffs for Unobservable Harms, Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 20–24), https://academic.oup.com/aler/advance-article-pdf/
doi/10.1093/aler/ahy007/25680584/ahy007.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
Atkinson’s sorting mechanism is related to a solution to the problem of strategic threats to
use injunctions proposed in an earlier article. See Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison,
Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45,
98–105 (1999). Unlike the mechanism developed in this Essay, which addresses the award
of emotional damages, Atkinson’s mechanism focuses on a binary choice offered to the
plaintiff between injunction (or speciﬁc performance) and damages when ex post
negotiation is not allowed.
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Of course, this sorting mechanism would work only if plaintiffs who
select the restoration remedy are barred from settling postjudgment and
releasing the defendant from the adjudged restoration obligation. And
the power of fakers to strategically seek restoration damages may also
lead to pretrial settlements that result in overcompensation. Thus, as this
Essay discusses,15 an additional ingredient for the success of the sorting
mechanism is the prevention of such shadow deals around the restoration remedy.
The restoration remedy can be applied to protect various interests
that, when violated, give rise to emotional rather than pecuniary harm. It
is particularly suitable to circumstances that involve violations of religious, political, family, reputational, spiritual, or moral values.16 For
example, products are increasingly marketed with the promise that they
conform to speciﬁc sets of values such as sustainability, organic production, animal welfare, religious standards, and political affiliation.17 Each
of these interests, when breached, can be restored via alternative
methods, often with great precision. And while the restoration remedy is
best suited to restoration of public-regarding interests, this Essay shows
how it also works when the impaired interest is private in nature.18
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the
inadequate treatment of emotional harms in contract and tort law. Part II
introduces the restoration remedy as a novel way to redress emotional
harm in general and in cases of harm to jointly consumed goods in
particular. Part III illustrates the application of the new remedy and its
advantages in the Volkswagen case. It also highlights the difficulties of
implementation and shows how they could be overcome. Finally, Part IV
discusses the social value of restoration damages, arguing that they achieve
the remedial goals of compensation and deterrence at low administrative
costs.

15. See infra section II.C.
16. See infra section III.C (discussing how restoration damages would be appropriate
in the Volkswagen case because Volkswagen marketed its vehicles as “green” and ecofriendly).
17. See, e.g., The Unstoppable Rise of Free-Range Eggs in Britain, Economist (Dec. 3,
2016), https://www.economist.com/britain/2016/12/03/the-unstoppable-rise-of-free-rangeeggs-in-britain [https://perma.cc/WM4N-PZE3] (“These days, retailers crow about their prochicken credentials. Marks & Spencer, an upmarket chain, has a 100% free-range egg policy.”);
Our Commitment to GMO Transparency, Whole Foods, https://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/
our-commitment-gmo-transparency [https://perma.cc/6WU9-PSXR] (last visited Aug. 15,
2018) (“At Whole Foods Market, we believe you have the right to choose what’s in your
food, and we are committed to GMO (genetically modiﬁed organism) transparency.”).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 106–107 (providing examples of private interests that could be served by restoration damages).
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I. RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL HARM IN PRIVATE LAW
This Essay aims to offer a novel solution for the compensation of
emotional harms. The first step is to show that there is a problem. This
Part identifies the problem: Emotional harms are currently undercompensated in private law. It surveys the rules for recovery of emotional harm
under contract and tort law to illustrate that problem. These rules determine when—not how much—a plaintiff is entitled to recover and rarely
impose liability for emotional harm. This Part also demonstrates that courts
recognize the problem of undercompensation, yet they are presently
unable to resolve it for mostly technical reasons that are rooted in measurement and veriﬁcation hurdles.
A.

Contract Law

1. Contract Law’s No-Emotional-Damages Rule. — In common law, a
breach of contract does not generally give rise to damages for the emotional harm it causes.19 This rule is puzzling. The goal of contract remedies is to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the contract
had not been breached. Courts generally recognize that, as an empirical
matter, a breach of contract is an emotionally disturbing event. They are
not shy to admit that the aggrieved party “might not be ‘made whole’
absent an award of mental distress damages.”20 Yet, they do not generally
award emotional damages.
One explanation often given for denying emotional damages is foreseeability: The breaching party did not know or have reason to know that
breach would also cause consequential emotional harm.21 This explanation is unsatisfying. Even courts that reject claims of emotional damages

19. See, e.g., Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 987, 989 (Cal. 1999) (holding that
emotional damages are not available in a defective construction case); Jankowski v. Mazzotta,
152 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (“[C]ontractor’s breaches in ways which could be
corrected . . . did not entitle owners to recover for mental anguish; owners could be fully
compensated by allowing only for pecuniary losses.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts
§ 12.17, at 810 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that a limitation “firmly rooted in tradition
generally denies recovery for emotional disturbance . . . resulting from breach of contract”);
24 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 64:7 (4th ed.
2002) (“Mental suffering caused by a breach of contract, although it may be a real injury,
is not generally considered as a basis for compensation in contractual actions.”).
20. Valentine v. Gen. Am. Credit, Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Mich. 1984).
21. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Hogue, 94 S.W. 924, 925 (Ark. 1906) (ruling that
damages for mental anguish could not be recovered because the defendant had no notice
that a failure to comply with the contract would cause mental suffering); Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 93 (N.C. 1990) (noting that proximate
causation and foreseeability are considerations in determining whether to impose liability
for emotional distress in contractual cases).
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recognize that “all breaches of contract do more or less” cause distress,
“vexation[,] and annoyance.”22
A second and better justiﬁcation for the no-emotional-damages rule
is the speculative nature of emotional harms.23 Contract law does not
allow compensation for uncertain harm,24 and emotional losses are
uncertain and hard to verify and quantify. Yet it’s not clear why emotional
damages should be barred entirely. If the magnitude of the harm varies
greatly and cannot be proven with accuracy, some “average” measure of
damages—or at the very least, some low-end measure that is unlikely to
err on the side of overcompensation—should be awarded.
A third possible justiﬁcation for denying emotional damages is their
avoidability.25 Compensated for the pecuniary loss from breach, the
aggrieved party is able to purchase performance elsewhere, and the distress suffered due to nonperformance ought to be cured, rendering any
additional emotional damages double compensation.26 Thus, for example, rather than bemoan the mental anguish from a breached employment contract, the discharged employee is prompted to pursue mitigation strategies by seeking substitute employment. This justiﬁcation, however, is limited to those cases in which the victim indeed could avoid the
emotional harm.
A related justification is based on the parties’ ex ante will.
Commentators have argued that the no-emotional-damages rule is the
default rule that mimics the parties’ will at the time of contracting.
Promisees prefer, under this view, to forgo emotional damages and save
the premium they would otherwise have to pay, through a price adjustment, for this expanded breach insurance.27 This claim is not based on
any empirical grounds. It is based on the assumption that, in contrast to a
pecuniary injury, an emotional injury does not increase an aggrieved
22. Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. 1957) (quoting 1 J.G. Sutherland, A
Treatise on the Law of Damages 156–57 (1882)); accord Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
295 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Mich. 1980) (“We recognize that breach of the insurance contract, as
with almost any agreement, results in some annoyance and vexation.”).
23. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“Damages for emotional disturbance . . . are often particularly difficult to establish and to
measure.”).
24. Id. § 352 (“Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established witb [sic] reasonable certainty.”).
25. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (Am. Law. Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (providing
that consequential damages are recoverable if they “could not reasonably be prevented by
cover or otherwise”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (“[D]amages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or
humiliation.”).
26. See, e.g., Jerome v. Mich. Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 300 N.W.2d 371, 372 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980) (reversing the trial court’s award for mental anguish so as to avoid an “improper
double recovery”).
27. See Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal
Stud. 35, 53 (1982).
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party’s marginal utility of money.28 If so, it would be irrational to transfer
money from the prebreach state to the postbreach state, especially if such
transfer involves transaction and litigation costs.29 The only anecdotal
support for this conjecture is the apparent absence of demand for ﬁrstparty insurance policies that cover emotional harms.30
This demand-for-insurance argument has a critical ﬂaw when
applied to contracts: It ignores deterrence. If emotional harm goes
uncompensated, the breaching party does not internalize the entire
negative impact of the breach and would take insufficient precautions to
guarantee performance. Ultimately, the parties’ rational ex ante interest
is to have their contract governed by remedial rules that induce optimal
performance incentives. Categorically excluding emotional damages
undermines this interest.31
2. Exceptions. — Despite its general reluctance to award emotional
damages, the common law has carved out narrow exceptions. These
exceptions identify scenarios in which unavoidable emotional harm is
particularly likely to result from a breach.32 The most prominent exception is when the emotional harm accompanies some physical injury.33 In
addition, courts recognize a “narrow exception” when the contract “has
elements of personality”—namely, “a contract meant to secure protection of personal interests.”34 Contracts are found to have a “personal
28. See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 228–31 (1987) (explaining the marginal utility of money argument); Ariel Porat, Economics of Remedies, in 2
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Private and Commercial Law 308, 320–21
(Francesco Parisi ed. 2017) (same).
29. See Richard J. Zeckhauser, Coverage for Catastrophic Illness, 21 Pub. Pol’y 149,
151–56 (1973) (applying these principles to the question of how we should allocate resources
to the treatment of catastrophic illness). For an attempt at a counterargument that victims
might be willing to insure against nonpecuniary losses, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1896–914 (1995); see also Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The
Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J.
Econ. 143, 143, 145–55 (1977) (developing a theoretical model concerning the demand
for insurance and the value of increases in the level of protection for irreplaceable
commodities, and ﬁnding that a rational individual will typically not fully insure an
irreplaceable commodity, such as good health, and may even choose to bet against losing
it). For an excellent survey of the literature and a novel experimental perspective, see
generally Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-and-Suffering Damages Be Abolished from Tort
Law? More Experimental Evidence, 55 U. Toronto L.J. 941 (2005).
30. See Rea, supra note 27, at 37–40 (arguing that there is no demand for ﬁrst-party
insurance policies for nonpecuniary losses).
31. See id.
32. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“[B]reach is of
such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.”).
33. See discussion infra section I.B.
34. Valentine v. Gen. Am. Credit, Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628, 630–31 (Mich. 1984)
(“Rather than look to the foreseeability of loss to determine the applicability of the exception, the courts have considered whether the contract ‘has elements of personality’ and
whether the ‘damage suffered upon the breach of the agreement is capable of adequate
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element,” as contrasted with the more common “commercial element,”
when their primary purpose is not economic or patrimonial but to
advance psychic satisfaction, secure relief from a particular emotional
inconvenience or annoyance, or confer a particular emotional enjoyment.35 The types of contracts recognized to have a “personal element”
seem to be relics of an older era.36 It is, for example, surprising that
courts do not generally recognize employment contracts to have an “element of personality.”37 Nevertheless, the “element of personality” doctrine is founded on a solid principle: Award emotional damages when
the parties entered the contract in pursuit of the very same emotional
interest that was eventually harmed.
While the “element of personality” test has been applied sparingly to
award stand-alone emotional damages, a similar test is used more generously to assess damages from defective performance.38 The plaintiffs in
such cases are seeking money damages to undo nonconforming performances and redo projects as promised, even though the cost of repair
might be signiﬁcantly higher than the diminution in market value that
the defect caused.39 This divergence between the two measures of the

compensation by reference to the [contract] terms . . . . .’” (ﬁrst quoting Stewart v. Rudner,
84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. 1957); then quoting Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295
N.W.2d 50, 63 (Mich. 1980))); see also Kewin, 295 N.W.2d at 63 (opining that emotional
damages are available when the contracts breached are “concerned not with trade and
commerce but with life and death, not with proﬁt but with elements of personality, not
with pecuniary aggrandizement but with matters of mental concern and solicitude”).
35. See, e.g., Valentine, 362 N.W.2d at 631 (holding that emotional damages should
not be awarded for the breach of an employment contract because the primary purpose of
forming such contracts is economic, not personal).
36. Typical examples include tour package contracts, contracts to perform cosmetic
surgeries, and contracts for providing services for weddings or funerals. See, e.g., Hirst v.
Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Mont. 1977) (sale of a casket); Lewis v.
Holmes, 34 So. 66, 68 (La. 1903) (wedding services); Sullivan v. O’Connor 296 N.E.2d
183, 189 (Mass. 1973) (cosmetic surgery); Jarvis v. Swan Tours [1972] EWCA (Civ) 8, [12]
(Eng.) (tourism).
37. See, e.g., Lyons v. Midwest Glazing, L.L.C., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1049 (N.D. Iowa
2002) (“Parties to an employment contract primarily exchange services for salary and
beneﬁts. Although employees may attach great personal and emotional signiﬁcance to
their employment, employment contracts principally serve an economic purpose.”);
Richmond v. Wyeth Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., 641 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.
Mich. 1986) (“The purpose [of an employment contract] is economic. With that rationale,
it is unlikely that the Michigan courts would hold a breach of a Toussaint contract would
be to recover damages for injury to person or property.”); Valentine, 362 N.W.2d at 631
(holding that an employment contract “is not entered into primarily to secure the protection of personal interests”).
38. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (“It is true
that in most cases the cost of replacement is the measure. The owner is entitled to the
money which will permit him to complete, unless the cost of completion is grossly and
unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained.” (citation omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 235–36 (Minn. 1939) (unﬁnished land reclamation); Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 890 (nonconforming pipes);

2018]

THE RESTORATION REMEDY IN PRIVATE LAW

1911

loss—the cost of repair versus the diminution in value—exists because
the market does not assign a signiﬁcant price differential to the completed performance.40 The lower market valuation indicates that the
value assigned by the plaintiff to the completion of the performance is
subjective and emotional, and not widely shared by market participants.
An example is when the plaintiff seeks to replace a new roof for the sole
reason that it was installed in a different color tone than speciﬁed.41
Courts struggle to resolve the remedial dilemma about whether to
protect “mere taste or preference, almost approaching whimsy.”42 For
example, they recognize that an “owner’s right to improve its property is
not trammeled by its small value”43 but at the same time regard damages
targeted to repair such property interests as wasteful. Courts sometimes
try to resolve this tension by asking whether the in-kind completion is
merely an incidental purpose of the contract44 or whether it is of special
value, so central that without it the goal of the contract for the plaintiff
would be frustrated.45 This test—whether the plaintiff had some personal
goal not measured by the commercial value of the contract—is strikingly
similar to the “personal” versus “commercial” interest test for emotional
damages.46 And yet in the context of defective performance, courts seem
to protect the emotional harm more robustly. The reason for the
differential application is probably the measurement problem: It is hard
to measure pure emotional harm and award emotional damages as an
add-on, whereas it is easy to measure the cost of repair necessary to avoid
the emotional harm. In the defective performance cases, plaintiffs are
asking for a money allowance to avoid rather than to compensate for
mental anguish. In this context, courts ﬁnd it easier to award compensation, which can be accurately measured as the amount needed to ﬁnish a
job or restore a prebreach state. If this is indeed the reason for courts’
greater readiness to redress emotional grievances in defective performance
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1962) (unﬁnished
land reclamation); Plante v. Jacobs, 103 N.W.2d 296, 297 (Wis. 1960) (misplaced wall).
40. See, e.g., Plante, 103 N.W.2d at 299 (“Expert witnesses for both parties, testifying
as to the value of the house, agreed that the misplacement of the wall had no effect on the
market price.”).
41. See Gory Associated Indus. v. Jupiter Rooﬁng & Sheet Metal, Inc., 358 So. 2d 93,
95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“If a proud householder . . . orders a new roof of red barrel
tile and the roofer instead installs a purple one, money damages for the reduced value of
his house may not be enough to offset the strident offense to aesthetic sensibilities . . . .”)
42. O.W. Grun Rooﬁng & Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975).
43. Groves, 286 N.W. at 237.
44. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 114.
45. See City Sch. Dist. of Elmira v. McLane Constr. Co., 445 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (App.
Div. 1981) (allowing recovery for the cost of repair because the aesthetic of the structure
was important to the plaintiffs); Landis v. William Fannin Builders, Inc., 951 N.E.2d 1078,
1089 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (same).
46. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (describing the “personal” versus
“commercial” interest test for emotional damages).
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cases, we suspect that the restoration measure proposed in this Essay
would encourage courts to expand liability for emotional harm.47
B.

Tort Law

Tort law permits recovery for emotional harms in more circumstances than contract law. Primarily, emotional distress is recoverable
when it accompanies an injury that has a physical manifestation.48 Emotional harm generated by a physical injury is relatively veriﬁable.49 Thus,
claims for emotional damages by victims of bodily injuries and their relatives—for loss of enjoyment of life or loss of consortium (companionship) respectively—are plausible.50 Conversely, stand-alone emotional
47. Another doctrine that indirectly depends on the presence of some emotional
harm is the speciﬁc performance remedy. It is available primarily when the performance
sought is unique, and damages are therefore difficult to ascertain so as to make the
aggrieved party truly whole. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (Am. Law
Inst. 1981). The presence of an emotional interest that “induce[s] a strong sentimental
attachment” typically renders damages inadequate. Id. § 360 cmt. b. When buyers attach
idiosyncratic, emotional, hard-to-measure value to a contract, market-based damages would
leave them undercompensated and unable to find a replacement that would restore that
emotional value. See Anthony T. Kronman, Speciﬁc Performance, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351,
362 (1978) (arguing that money damages may leave a promisee under- or overcompensated when the subject matter of a particular contract is unique and has no easily
established market value).
Further, the presence of an emotional harm is relevant for the enforcement of
liquidated damages. When emotional harm resulting from a breach is likely, courts tend to
uphold liquidated damages instead of ﬁnding them overcompensatory and unenforceable.
See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (referring to “difficulties
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy” as reasons to enforce liquidated damages); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 356 cmt. b (“The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or of
establishing its amount with the requisite certainty (see § 351), the easier it is to show that
the amount ﬁxed is reasonable.”). See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 558–77
(1977) (analyzing the economics of liquidated damages).
48. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A (Am. Law Inst. 1965); see also, e.g.,
Tuttle v. Meyer Dairy Prods. Co., 138 N.E.2d 429, 429–30 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (stating
that in the absence of any physical injury, a seller of food is not liable for “fright,
apprehension[,] and mental anguish” suffered).
49. Cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical and Emotional Harm § 45
cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2012) (“Usually the existence of bodily harm can be veriﬁed objectively while the existence and severity of emotional harm is ordinarily dependent on selfreporting.”).
50. See id. § 4 cmt. d (stating that plaintiffs can recover damages for emotional harm
that stems from a physical injury); id. § 48 (providing that a third party can recover damages for emotional harm that results from witnessing the physical injury of a family member); see also Dan B. Dobbs et al., Torts and Compensation: Personal Accountability and
Social Responsibility for Injury 581–90 (7th ed. 2013) [hereinafter Dobbs, Torts and
Compensation] (noting that some states require that an emotional injury be medically
diagnosable as an emotional disorder, while others allow recovery only when the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff a physical danger that led to the emotional harm).
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harm, not accompanied by physical injury, is generally uncompensated
under tort law unless intentionally inﬂicted.51 Difficulties of proof, the
risk of frivolous claims, and ﬂoodgate concerns are the main policy
considerations underlying the no-emotional-damages rule.52
But there are exceptions. Some exceptions are general and baked
into torts that are speciﬁcally designed to protect against nonpecuniary
wrongs, such as libel,53 assault,54 false imprisonment,55 and intentional
inﬂiction of emotional distress.56 Another exception permits plaintiffs to
For loss of consortium, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 693 (“One who by reason of
his tortious conduct is liable to one spouse for illness or other bodily harm is subject to
liability to the other spouse for the resulting loss of the society and services of the ﬁrst
spouse . . . .”).
51. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical and Emotional Harm § 46
cmt. h (“[A] plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to cause severe emotional
harm to the plaintiff . . . .”); see also Sullivan v. Bos. Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Mass.
1993) (requiring the injured victims to show objective evidence of their emotional distress
to prove a negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress claim).
52. See Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201 (Alaska 1995) (“The basic assumption . . . is that emotional distress without physical injury is relatively trivial and easily
feigned.”); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that “the physical injury requirement will insure that the claims permitted are only the
most genuine”); Coleman v. Humane Soc’y of Memphis, No. W2012–02687–COA–R9–CV,
2014 WL 587010, at *10–13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2014) (surveying cases that employed
a higher standard of proof to mitigate the risk of frivolous negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims); see also Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 823 (2000) [hereinafter Dobbs,
Law of Torts] (arguing that emotional distress differs from one plaintiff to another and
cannot easily be measured equally); Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent
Inﬂiction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 831–32 (2004) (arguing that
because emotional distress is hard to prove, courts are more wary of fraudulent and
frivolous emotional claims). But see Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795,
810 (Cal. 1993) (“While we agree . . . that meaningful limits on the class of potential
plaintiffs and clear guidelines for resolving disputes in advance of trial are necessary,
imposing a physical injury requirement represents an inherently ﬂawed and inferior
means of attempting to achieve these goals.”). For a recent account of the categories of
cases in which emotional harm is recoverable, see Robert L. Rabin, Dov Fox on Reproductive
Negligence : A Commentary, 117 Colum. L. Rev. Online 228, 230–33 (2017), https://
columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Rabin_Commentary-on-ReproductiveNegligence.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5XK-Y7CB].
53. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623 (“One who is liable to another for a libel or
slander is liable also for emotional distress and bodily harm that is proved to have been
caused by the defamatory publication.”).
54. Id. § 21.
55. Id. § 35.
56. In negligence cases, courts have also imposed liability for emotional harm when
the harm resulted from injury to another or from loss of consortium. See Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989) (holding that obtaining damages from emotional
distress caused by observing the injury to another is possible when: (1) the plaintiff is
closely related to the injured victim, (2) the plaintiff is present at the scene of the injury,
and (3) as a result, the plaintiff suffers serious emotional distress); Ferriter v. Daniel
O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 703 (Mass. 1980) (accepting a claim of loss of
parental consortium); see also Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 52, at 825; Dobbs, Torts
and Compensation, supra note 50, at 591–95.
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secure injunctions against prospective tortious behavior, primarily in nuisance cases.57 Here, rather than engage in the inaccurate exercise of
redress ex post, the law allows an ex ante injunction.
Environmental statutes provide further recovery for emotional
harms that arise from damage to the environment. For example, plaintiffs can recover for the “existence value” that reﬂects the psychological
beneﬁt from the mere knowledge that an environmental resource exists
and will continue to exist.58 Additionally, governmental trustees are
permitted to sue polluters for damages to natural resources, including
“nonuse” values that stand for emotional harm.59 For example, under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), wrongdoers are liable for “damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of” natural resources.60 CERCLA also explicitly states:
“The measure of damages . . . shall not be limited by the sums which can
be used to restore or replace such resources.”61 In the few decided cases,
courts have awarded damages for aesthetic and existence values, which
are both surrogates for types of emotional harm.62
57. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 933 cmt. b (mentioning nuisance as a tort
that is frequently the subject of an injunction suit). For an extended review of injunctive
relief in nuisance cases, see Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution
517–28 (2d ed. 1993). Professors Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s classic explanation for this exception suggested that injunctions protect the idiosyncratic values owners
ascribe to their property better than damages. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L.
Rev. 1089, 1108 (1972) (“Taney may be sentimentally attached to his land. As a result,
eminent domain may grossly undervalue what Taney would actually sell for, even if it
sought to give him his true valuation of his tract.”); cf. supra note 47 (discussing speciﬁc
performance).
58. See Note, Existence-Value Standing, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 775, 784 (2016) (discussing
an early draft of legislation combating climate change, which includes a citizen-suit
provision).
59. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); id. § 1321(b)(7)(B)(ii)
(providing that failure to comply with particular provisions of the Act “shall be subject to a
civil penalty in an amount of up to $25,000 per day of violation or an amount up to 3 times
the costs incurred by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund as a result of such failure”);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (2012); id. § 9651(c)(2) (“Such regulations shall identify the best available
procedures to determine such damages, including both direct and indirect injury, destruction, or loss and shall take into consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover.”).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(C).
61. Id. § 9607(f).
62. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(“Option and existence values may represent ‘passive’ use, but they nonetheless reﬂect
utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus, prima facie, ought to be included in a
damage assessment.”); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental
Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 Duke L.J. 879, 911
(1994) (explaining the statutory and regulatory provisions that constitute the legal basis
for such cases); Note, supra note 58, at 782–83 (summarizing the case law on this matter).
Similar to contract law, tort law allows recovery for the costs of repairing a damaged property
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II. THE RESTORATION MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Our brief tour across private law’s remedy doctrines in Part I showed
that emotional harm is not often recoverable and receives inconsistent
treatment. Technical veriﬁcation and measurement difficulties rather
than substantive concerns explain this remedial anomaly. If the obstacles
for assessing recovery for emotional harm could be overcome, the makewhole principle could be better fulfilled. In this Part, we introduce the
restoration remedy as a potential solution for these technical difficulties.
The restoration remedy aims at overcoming the veriﬁcation and
measurement problems. It consists of an order to pay money not directly
to the plaintiff but instead to ﬁnance the actual in-kind reclamation of a
close replacement. It seeks to ﬁnance a completed preservation of the
preharm state for the beneﬁt of the plaintiff.
Section II.A begins by presenting the technique of restoration. Section II.B then shows how restoration damages solve the problem of veriﬁcation through an election-of-remedy sorting mechanism. Section II.C
explains how renegotiation, settlements, and side deals could affect the
restoration remedy, and section II.D discusses the restoration remedy’s
scope of application. Finally, section II.E distinguishes the restoration
remedy from other remedies that feature some resemblance to it.
A.

The Mechanics of Restoration Damages

This section starts by introducing the mechanics of restoration damages, a new proposed remedy. The key ingredient of the remedy, presented
in section II.A.1, is the “intermediate underlying interest.” This is the
interest whose impairment led to the emotional harm and that therefore
must be the target of the make-whole valuation. Section II.A.2 then
addresses some benchmark issues concerning the measurement of the
underlying interest. It argues that, in many cases, it would be easier to
measure the underlying interest than to measure the emotional harms
suffered by the plaintiffs.
1. The Intermediate Underlying Interest. — Any violation of a right—contractual, proprietary, or bodily—hurts some underlying interest. At the
most general level, a violation reduces the aggrieved party’s utility and thus
hurts the underlying interest of maximizing one’s utility. At the most
concrete level, a violation denies the aggrieved party’s plan to derive
speciﬁc beneﬁts from an identiﬁed asset, or from her bodily integrity,
and thus hurts the underlying interest associated with this precise plan.
Damage remedies adopt the most abstract concept of an underlying
interest and aim to restore the aggrieved party’s utility by awarding money
even if those costs far exceed diminution in the property’s objective value. Supra section I.A.
This usually occurs when the damaged property has special nonmarket value and its destruction likely leads to emotional harm. See In re September 11th Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 535,
542 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (clarifying the specialty property rules).
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sufficient to offset the reduction of utility caused by the violation.63 Inkind remedies adopt the most concrete concept of an underlying interest
and aim to restore the aggrieved party’s specific use and enjoyment arising
from an identiﬁed plan that was drawn prior to the violation.64
But the concept of an “underlying interest” as the target of remedial
law’s make-whole objective does not need to take one of these two polar
manifestations. The aggrieved party’s violated plan may have taken a speciﬁc manifestation, but it was selected in order to advance a more general personal agenda. This general agenda is more targeted than the
abstract, tautological, all-encompassing “utility maximization.” Often, it is
the advancement of a speciﬁc intermediate value or preference, which
could also be advanced by close substitutes.
Critical to the design of restoration damages is the conceptual and
empirical existence of an intermediate underlying interest, which when
violated by the defendant gives rise to the plaintiff’s emotional harm.
Conceptually, this interest is a person’s organizing goal, which accounts
for the emotional satisfaction from her speciﬁc choices and actions.65 An
underlying interest may be a taste, a value, a need or necessity, a sentiment or attachment, a political or religious preference, or an ideology.
An underlying interest may be advanced—although not always and not
perfectly—by various substitute courses of actions. If one course of action
is thwarted, other efforts may be used to satisfy the underlying interest.
Consider a religious or political preference relating to one’s diet
that is manifested by a plan to eat only vegetarian food. A subversion of
this plan, for example, by deceptively labeling a canned soup product
prepared with meat stock as “vegetarian,” impairs the deceived buyers’
most general interest in maximizing utility as well as their most concrete
63. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981)
(“Ordinarily, when a court concludes that there has been a breach of contract, it enforces
the broken promise by protecting the expectation that the injured party had when he
made the contract.”).
64. See id. § 357 cmt. a (“An order of speciﬁc performance is intended to produce as
nearly as is practicable the same effect that the performance due under a contract would
have produced. It usually, therefore, orders a party to render the performance that he
promised.”).
65. See, e.g., Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. Colo. L. Rev. 863, 880–83 (2018)
(discussing the rise of the “market for virtue” and the connection between consumers’
choices and their core interests and values). See generally David Vogel, The Market for
Virtue (2005) (chronicling the rise of conscious consumerism); Josée Johnston, The CitizenConsumer Hybrid: Ideological Tensions and the Case of Whole Foods Market, 37 Theory
& Soc’y 229, 239 (2008) (describing how activists have encouraged consumers to “think
critically, buy more selectively, and seek out information on the environmental and social
costs involved in their daily meals”); Global Consumers Are Willing to Put Their Money
Where Their Heart Is When It Comes to Goods and Services from Companies Committed to
Social Responsibility, Nielsen (June 17, 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/
2014/global-consumers-are-willing-to-put-their-money-where-their-heart-is.html [https://
perma.cc/TGW3-6KMT] (“Consumers around the world are saying loud and clear that a
brand’s social purpose is among the factors that inﬂuence purchase decisions.”).
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interest in eating a vegetarian soup. But this subversion is best viewed as a
violation of an intermediate underlying interest generally relating to the
reduction of meat consumption. This intermediate underlying interest
may be the concern for animal welfare, namely the interest to protect
some species of animals from slaughter; or environmental protection,
namely the interest to protect the environment from harms caused by
meat production; or one’s physical health, namely the interest to avoid
the adverse private or public health effects of meat consumption.66
Because the speciﬁc underlying interest may vary across people, its
identiﬁcation is an empirical challenge, which we address in section II.B
below. Once identiﬁed, however, the presence of a known underlying
interest makes it possible to design a remedy that would make that interest whole when impaired. In the absence of such an intermediate interest, the only in-kind remedy is a reversal of the concrete harm. When
such a reversal is impossible, money damages aimed to undo the reduction in the aggrieved party’s total utility are the only remaining remedy.
But if an intermediate underlying interest exists and is identiﬁed, an inkind remedy can be tailored to a reversal of the harm done to the
underlying interest rather than to its actual concrete manifestation.
Claims for emotional harms are easy to fake and hard to verify. But
plaintiffs’ declarations about which intermediate underlying interest was
damaged are not susceptible to the same veriﬁcation problems. First, the
interest declared by the plaintiff may be the same as the one touted by
sellers luring people to buy a product. For instance, when sellers market
coffee as “fair trade,” they promise consumers that they take concern for
the rights of marginalized workers and producers. When meat is sold as
“halal,” the concern for the religious preferences of buyers is central to
the transaction. Such promises of “fair trade” and “halal” form a veriﬁable part of the basis of the bargain. Second, restoration damages could
rely on a plaintiff’s declaration as to which intermediate underlying interest was damaged even in the absence of corroborating precontractual
statements by the seller. There is good reason to assume that the plaintiff
would be sincere because she would like the true underlying interest to
be restored. In the vegetarian food example, different victims could
require different restoration avenues because of the variety of their
underlying interests. In such cases, if the victims banded together in a
collective action, restoration damages would be divided and distributed
to different targets to repair different sources of emotional harms.

66. See, e.g., Charlotte J.S. De Backer & Liselot Hudders, From Meatless Mondays to
Meatless Sundays: Motivations for Meat Reduction Among Vegetarians and Semi-vegetarians
Who Mildly or Signiﬁcantly Reduce Their Meat Intake, 53 Ecology Food & Nutrition 639,
640 (2014) (exploring vegetarians’ motives for reducing their meat consumption); Matthew
B. Ruby, Vegetarianism: A Blossoming Field of Study, 58 Appetite 141, 142 (2012) (same).
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Other ways to verify the underlying interest include employing
representative surveys of like populations,67 big data,68 statistics,69 and
expert opinions.70 In the vegetarian food example discussed above, plaintiffs and courts could use surveys and statistics to verify the number of
buyers that are true vegetarians and evaluate the differing concerns motivating buyers’ vegetarianism. Alternatively, in the near future, they might
be able to analyze big data to gain insights into consumer preferences in
general and the plaintiff class in particular.71 Patterns in this information
might provide direct evidence of consumer preferences and help predict
the intensity of preferences of the speciﬁc individuals in the plaintiff
class.
2. Measuring Restoration. — Even if courts accurately identify the
underlying interest, a problem of measurement remains: How much
should a court order a defendant to invest in the substitute in-kind
restoration? Sometimes this problem can be trivial, as when the underlying interest is measured by a quantitative metric. For example, if the
emotional loss arises from excessive pollution emissions, as in the
Volkswagen case, an offsetting reduction of emissions elsewhere would
achieve the correct restoration.72 But at other times the problem is hard,
as when the underlying interest is qualitative and not restorable by close
substitutes. The loss of a loved one, property with deep sentimental
67. For example, in the natural resources context, techniques include the revealedpreference technique, which uses the price of other goods and services to elicit people’s
demand for environmental resources. Another approach is the stated-preference technique, which uses survey methods in which hypothetical markets are created by way of
structured questionnaires for respondents to express their preferences. See MacAlister
Elliott & Partners Ltd. et al., Study on the Valuation and Restoration of Biodiversity
Damage for the Purpose of Environmental Liability 4–10 (2001), http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/legal/liability/pdf/biodiversity_annexes.pdf [http://perma.cc/694J-DNRF]
(presenting the main economic approaches that are used to evaluate damages to natural
resources). For criticism of the use of stated-preferences surveys to estimate damages, see
W. Kip Viscusi, Alternative Approaches to Valuing the Health Impacts of Accidents:
Liability Law and Prospective Evaluations, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 49, 58 (1983) (“The
principal difficulty [with surveys] is that interviews may not elicit accurate responses because
respondents have no incentive to give thoughtful or honest answers. As a result, the emphasis
has been on analyzing the implicit trade-offs revealed in actual decisions.”).
68. Cf. Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 1417, 1434–40 (2014) (discussing the current use of big
data by various industries).
69. For criticism of the use of statistics to estimate damages, see W. Kip Viscusi, The
Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 195, 214–18
(2000).
70. See Jonathan P. Vallano, Psychological Injuries and Legal Decision Making in
Civil Cases: What We Know and What We Do Not Know, 6 Psychol. Inj. & L. 99, 100 (2013)
(describing the role of expert testimony by mental health professionals in psychological
injury claim cases).
71. See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at 1440–50 (surveying possible applications of big data).
72. See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text (introducing the Volkswagen case).
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value, or a once-in-a-lifetime experience creates the greatest emotional
harm but is the hardest to restore. In between the easy and the hard
cases, there is a continuum of restorability. For example, if the emotional
loss arises from the consumption of food that violates a religious dietary
code, restoration damages could be paid for an offsetting religious
promotion. But among the many ways to promote religious beliefs, which
one should be chosen? (We are reminded of our own tradition’s humorous quip, “ask two Jews, you’ll get three opinions.”) And even if the suitable avenue for religious promotion is identified, through plaintiffs’ declarations or other methods noted above, how much restoration is enough?
The main measurement hurdle is the estimation of the intensity of
the emotional harm. Even if the impaired interest is known, the degree
and intensity of impairment may vary across people.73 At times, courts
might have information about the intensity of preferences by using the
methods mentioned above74 and could adjust the restoration measure
accordingly. Other times, courts would have to use less sophisticated averages and approximations. This is a standard methodological challenge
for any damage measure,75 and standard solutions should apply to
restoration damages.
As discussed below, despite these limitations, restoration damages
would likely increase the total redress for emotional harms and the accuracy of compensation relative to existing remedies.76 It is important to
recall that the measurement of restoration is rarely more difficult than
the measurement of the existing remedy of simple money damages for
emotional harm. With money damages, courts similarly face the
73. For example, in class action lawsuits, different class members commonly suffer
different degrees of injury. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
commonality among putative class members, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), variation in
injury severity and damages does not necessarily prevent the certiﬁcation of a class, see,
e.g., De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 233 (7th Cir. 1983) (“It is very
common for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions to involve differing damage awards for different
class members.”). But cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011)
(“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have ‘suffered the same injury.’” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157
(1982))).
74. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
75. Proxies and rough estimates are commonly used to measure uncertain pecuniary
losses. For example, in calculating lost earnings, courts use approximations to establish a
plaintiff’s earning capacity and life expectancy. See, e.g., Karpov v. Net Trucking, Inc., No.
1:06–CV–195–TLS, 2010 WL 5058538, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 2010) (using statistical
tables to calculate the victim’s lost earnings as a result of death); Classic Coach, Inc. v.
Johnson, 823 So. 2d 517, 528 (Miss. 2002) (“[I]n cases brought for the wrongful death of a
child . . . the deceased child’s income would have been the equivalent of the national average as set forth by the United States Department of Labor.”); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 924 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (“In the case of permanent injuries or injuries
causing death, it is . . . permissible to use mortality tables and other evidence as to the
average expectancy of a large number of persons.”).
76. See infra section IV.A (explaining why restoration damages provide more accurate compensation than monetary damages).
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challenges of evaluating the intensity of the emotional harm and setting
an arbitrary exchange rate of harm to dollars.77 We think that it is
typically better to approximate the underlying interest and provide a
rough restoration of it than to toss off a sum of money that “equals” the
emotional harm. A rough approximation of a restoration remedy would
surely improve upon one prevailing alternative—awarding no emotional
damages at all. As discussed below, it will also improve upon money damages by weeding out fake claims.78 In particular, even if courts overestimated restoration damages, defendants would be able, under the election scheme developed below, to mitigate its effects by offering plaintiffs
money payments high enough to induce many of them to take the money
and not insist on restoration.
Still, signiﬁcant measurement problems might at times limit the
application of restoration damages, or at the very least condition their
application on plaintiffs’ success in proposing reliable methods of measurement. Thus, although restoration damages may not always be superior
to the traditional remedies, they are certainly not inferior. And if restoration damages improve the accuracy of compensation in some of the
cases, they deserve to be considered as a central remedy in private law’s
arsenal.
B.

Election of Remedy

Section II.A presented the ﬁrst ingredient of restoration damages—
the intermediate underlying interest aimed at solving the measurement
problem. This section presents the second necessary ingredient to
address the verification problem. To do so, it develops a novel sorting
mechanism to screen out fake claims for emotional harm and distinguish
the varying degrees of intensity of this harm. This section starts by presenting the problems the mechanism is designed to solve, then describes
the mechanism through simple numerical examples, and ﬁnally discusses
the preconditions to its effective implementation.
1. The Problem. — Section II.A argued that the restoration remedy
addresses the problem of measurement of emotional harm. The restoration remedy does so by paying for in-kind substitution and thus rendering it unnecessary to measure the dollar equivalent of an emotional
harm. But a second fundamental problem of veriﬁcation looms, also due
to the incommensurability of emotional harms. How do courts know that
a party seeking restoration damages was truly emotionally distressed? If
the harm is to a jointly consumed good, how can courts be certain that
only plaintiffs who value it would be counted in calculating the necessary
77. Contract law disfavors emotional damages in part because they are complicated
to measure. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981)
(“Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily allowed. Even if they are foreseeable, they are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure.”).
78. See infra section II.B (developing a mechanism that screens out fake claims).
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restoration? Furthermore, even if they were certain that a plaintiff suffered emotional harm, her harm might be too small to warrant costly
restoration. How can such wasteful restoration be avoided?79
Return to the mislabeled-vegetarian-food example. All patrons were
deceived, but only patrons with vegetarian preferences were emotionally
harmed, and it is only their harms that need to be restored. What would
stop other nonvegetarian customers from piling on fake claims of emotional harm? In particular, if the lawsuit is brought as a class action on
behalf of all consumers who purchased the mislabeled product, how can
the court determine who truly suffered harm to their underlying vegetarian interest, and separate them from those who bought the same product
but suffered no or small emotional loss?80 In litigation, the plaintiff
would want to inﬂate the perceived emotional harm. And when the
underlying interest is in a jointly consumed good, third parties to the
litigation might offer side-payments to fakers to encourage them to ask
for restoration.
Even in individual suits, parties not inﬂicted with emotional distress
may want to mimic or exaggerate the claim of emotional harm because it
would give them additional grounds for recovery. While fakers do not
gain any beneﬁt from the restoration remedy, they recognize, strategically, that the remedy is costly to the defendant. The value of restoration
damages to fakers accrues from the opportunity to extract payments
from the defendant in return for releasing her from the obligation to
fund the remedy. Such a Coasian bargain safeguards against wasteful
investment in restoration and thus solves any ex post inefficiency problem that many courts seem to be troubled by.81 It would still be distortive to
ex ante incentives, however, because compensation would be excessive.
We discuss below an analytically simple method to prevent strategic
claiming by fakers: Prohibit postjudgment settlements and side-payments
to third parties, thereby making the right of restoration inalienable.82 If
fakers can’t sell back the restoration remedy, they will not seek it at the

79. This last problem disappears if it is clear to the court that the cost of restoration is
lower than all the plaintiffs’ combined emotional harm.
80. See, e.g., Block v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 01 CH 9137, 2001 WL 36414155 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. May 19, 2003), aff’d, 885 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). In the settlement agreement, the class members were defined as “all persons resident in the United States, including, but not limited to, vegetarians and Hindus, who: (i) have consumed food products from
or at McDonald’s Restaurants in the United States since July 23, 1990; and (ii) have concerns,
objections, or dietary restrictions, whether ethical, moral, religious, philosophical, or healthrelated, with respect to the consumption of beef or meat . . . .” Settlement Agreement at 5,
Block, No. 01 CH 9137, 2001 WL 36414155 [hereinafter McDonald’s Settlement], https://
bergermontague.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/mcdonalds-settlement.pdf [http://
perma.cc/53LR-KAPB].
81. See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 112–13 (Okla.
1962) (discussing the economic waste concern of restoration damages).
82. Infra section II.C.
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outset.83 Notice that in such cases, it is enough to impose a small litigation cost on plaintiffs to weed out the fakers. The combination of restoration damages as the sole remedy for emotional harm and a small litigation cost on plaintiffs guarantees that only sincere plaintiffs recover.
But disposal of fake suits may not be achieved so easily if plaintiffs
suffered even a modest quantum of emotional harm. We need a more
robust method to separate sincere plaintiffs from the less sincere. There
are probably evidentiary ways to address this problem of veriﬁcation, but
they may be costly and require individualized inquiry into preferences
and behavior, defeating the utility of class actions. In aggregate suits, a
court may recognize that some of the plaintiffs are sincere about their
emotional loss claims, but it would be unmanageable to sort plaintiffs
one by one and accomplish adequate compensation. In individual suits,
courts might collect clues to adjudge the sincerity of emotional harm
claims,84 but this would complicate the litigation. Ultimately, an evidencebased veriﬁcation mechanism is impractical, explaining why current doctrine prefers to resolve the emotional harm challenge by general
categorization. We need an alternative to the evidence-based or categories-based mechanisms. The remainder of this section proposes a sorting,
or screening, mechanism that induces plaintiffs, each individually aware
of his or her intrinsic emotional harm, to self-select.85
2. The Sorting Mechanism. — Courts can use incentives to sort plaintiffs. To illustrate how an incentive-compatible mechanism works, section
II.B.2.a first considers a simplified setting in which there are only two types
of plaintiffs. Later, section II.B.2.b shows how the mechanism would work
in sorting out plaintiffs when there are varying degrees of emotional
injury.
a. Two Types. — A plaintiff claims to have suffered emotional harm,
but the court cannot tell whether the claim is true. Assume that there are
only two types of plaintiffs: “Sincere” and “Faker.” The Sincere suffered
high emotional harm that an accurately measured restoration remedy
would fully offset; the Faker suffered no emotional harm at all.
As with any sorting mechanism, the key is to offer all plaintiffs a menu
of remedy choices that separates them. With two plaintiff types, only two
83. The requirement of no postjudgment renegotiation would require courts to exercise additional monitoring. This Essay explains how this can be done. It further argues
that in class actions comprising numerous victims, the defendant herself might ﬁnd it in
her best interest to refuse to renegotiate, even if allowed by law. See infra section II.C.1.
(explaining how defendants will choose not to renegotiate after trial, knowing that breaching a promise not to renegotiate would be easily detectable by others).
84. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, The Future of Emotional Harm, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2605,
2610–13 (2015) (arguing that in individual suits, courts are skeptical of emotional harm
claims and pose high barriers for the claimants).
85. A formal working paper has separately developed a self-selection mechanism
similar to the one developed in this Essay. See Atkinson, supra note 14 (addressing the
problem of choice between damages and injunctions in private harm cases in contracts).
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remedy options are needed. A Faker does not care about restoration
damages and will choose a remedial option that contains the most money
damages. The Sincere, by contrast, desires both restoration and money
damages, and might choose a remedial option with less money but more
restoration. With this in mind, the two remedial options that need to be
offered are straightforward: (1) restoration, paid directly to repair in full the
underlying interest of a Sincere; and (2) money, a “modest” unrestricted
sum of cash paid to the plaintiff’s pocket.
A Sincere would choose Option One because she values restoration
and because Option Two—with only a small sum of money in it—is not
attractive enough relative to the value of restoration. A Faker would
choose Option Two, no matter how small the sum of money in it, because
Option One is worthless to her. In a sense, Option Two is designed as a
bait for the sole purpose of smoking out the unharmed Fakers. By choosing the money damages, a Faker reveals her bluff and would be counted
out from the restoration calculation. A Faker gets money for nothing—a
modest amount of pecuniary recovery despite suffering no emotional
harm. This is a standard inefficiency in any sorting equilibrium, a necessary evil to overcome the problem of incomplete information. But as
long as the money damages in Option Two are small, this distortion is
relatively benign.
Notice the importance of the inalienability condition. Once the
plaintiff makes a remedial choice, it must not be renegotiated between
the parties or else a Faker would also choose the costlier restoration remedy of Option One. If able to trade the remedy with the defendant or
with a third party, a Faker would expect to extract a bounty greater than
the modest sum in Option Two. As explained below,86 the inalienability
condition poses quite a challenge. It must stop not only ex post
renegotiation of the remedy, but also various forms of ex ante agreements. As with any sorting mechanism, renegotiation may lead to its
unraveling. Rendering the mechanism renegotiation-proof is a critical
institutional challenge.
b. More Than Two Types. — How would the sorting mechanism
change when there are more than two types of plaintiffs? Imagine that
along with the Faker and the Sincere, there is now also a third type of
plaintiff who suffered some mild emotional harm: an “Intermediate.”
The Intermediate cares about the underlying interest and beneﬁts from
restoration, but less than the Sincere. This three-plaintiff setting presents
a capsule for understanding how the sorting mechanism would work in
reality, in which plaintiffs likely vary along a continuum.
This section shows that it is still possible to separate the different
plaintiff types by offering a menu of remedial options that induces each
type to choose a different option. But it also shows that a three-option
86. See infra sections II.C.1, II.C.3 (discussing in detail why post-trial renegotiation
and side deals could frustrate the effectiveness of the sorting mechanism proposed here).
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menu might be more complex and less efficient than a two-option menu.
In the two-type case, the inefficiency due to sorting amounts to a negligible bounty paid to the Faker. In the multitype setting, greater inefficiency
would result because the Faker bounty would need to be signiﬁcantly
higher. This would inevitably involve signiﬁcant overcompensation of
some types of plaintiffs, resulting in overdeterrence for defendants.
Because of these costs, full sorting would no longer be the right objective
for a remedy scheme. It would be better, at least in the types of cases
identiﬁed below, to set up a remedial menu that leads to some partial
“pooling” so that different types of plaintiffs end up choosing the same
remedy. We use a brief numerical illustration with simple algebra to draw
out these general insights and explain their underlying intuition.
Consider the following scenario. The defendant caused harm to the
environment that costs $100 to restore. The court can order any mix of
restoration (R) and money (M) damages to compensate the plaintiff.
The plaintiff values, as V, the damages according to the following simple
formula:
V = M + aR
The term “a” distinguishes the different types of plaintiffs. A Faker is
identiﬁed by a = 0, namely, she values only the money damages. For her,
V = M. The Sincere is identiﬁed by a = 1, and for her any combination of
restoration and money damages is valued as V = M + R. In between, the
Intermediate is distinguished by 0 < a < 1. The court cannot observe a,
and thus cannot tell the plaintiff’s type. Notice that a simple remedy of R
= $100 would perfectly redress each type of plaintiff’s true emotional loss,
but would also be prohibitively expensive, imposing costs on the defendant exceeding the harm caused.
To separate the three types of plaintiffs, the court may present a
menu of three remedial options. As in the two-type case, the menu
should include a pure restoration damages option that would be chosen
by the Sincere, and perhaps a pure money damages option to sort out
the Faker. In addition, the menu would now have to include a hybrid
option for the Intermediate. To begin constructing such menu, consider
the following options:
(1) Restoration damages, no money: R = $100; M = 0;
(2) Hybrid damages: R = RH ; M = MH ;
(3) Money damages, no restoration: R = 0; M = MH + 1.
Option One is intended to provide full restoration to the Sincere.
Option Three is intended to attract the Faker as it provides the greatest
money damages (hence the added $1).87 Option Two is intended to attract
87. Option Three must offer slightly more cash than the next best cash option, Option
Two; otherwise, Fakers would choose Option Two even though they derive no benefit from
the costly restoration it offers.
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only the Intermediate. For this design to succeed, two “incentive constraints” must be met:
(S*)
(I*)

MH + RH ≤ 100
MH + aRH ≥ 100a

Condition (S*) guarantees that the Sincere would prefer the full
restoration of Option One to the package of partial restoration and
money offered under Option Two. Condition (I*) guarantees that the
Intermediate would prefer Option Two to Option One. By construction,
the Faker, but no one else, prefers Option Three.
Assuming that the three types of plaintiffs are equally likely, the total
cost of compensation to the defendant under this sorting scheme would
be proportional to:
Total Cost = 100 + RH + MH + MH + 1
We know, from condition (I*), that
RH ≥ 100 –

MH
a

and thus that
Total Cost ≥ 100 + 100 –

MH
+ MH + MH + 1 ,
a

which, after simplifying, can be written as:
Total Cost ≥ 201 +

2a – 1
MH
a

Total cost of compensation depends on a, the intensity of the emotional harm to the Intermediate type. If a is high—here, if a > ½ —the
total cost is minimized by MH = 0, which from the two incentive conditions requires RH = 100. In this case, Option Two—the hybrid option—
becomes identical to Option One. The Sincere and the Intermediate
types would be pooled into the same selection. The intuition is the following: The higher a, the greater the money component that needs to be
added to Option Two for any reduction of its restoration component. But
any such increase in the money payoff in Option Two has to be matched
by an identical increase in the money payoff in Option Three since
Option Three has to offer money damages at least equal to those offered
by Option Two. For high enough levels of a, this added monetary cost is
too burdensome, and the defendant would prefer to compensate the
Intermediate type with full restoration and no money damages—that is,
with Option One.88
88. The cutoff level a > ½ is speciﬁc to this example, in which there are three plaintiff
types that exist with equal likelihood.
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The results flip if a ≤ ½. Now the total cost is minimized by MH = 100a,
namely the maximal level of MH that is consistent (from the two incentive
conditions) with non-negative RH. Option Two, under this assumption,
would not contain any restoration component (that is, RH = 0) because it
provides such a high monetary component. Here, the Intermediate and
the Faker types would be pooled into the same selection, which contains
only a money component. The intuition is the following: With low a,
giving restoration damages to the Intermediate achieves little savings in
terms of reduced money damages in Option Two. It is therefore more
effective to load Option Two with cash. Yet because the Intermediate can
always select Option One and enjoy a payoff of 100a, the minimum cash
necessary in Option Two is 100a. This would also be the money payment
offered under Option Three, since both Two and Three contain no
restoration.
To recap, while it is possible to offer a menu of remedies that leads
to the full sorting of plaintiffs according to the intensity of the emotional
harm suffered, such a scheme would lead to overcompensation. Those
who have not been harmed would have to be offered signiﬁcant monetary bounties, and the more variation there is across plaintiff types, the
greater the overcompensation problem. Such overcompensation would
undermine the compensatory goal—to compensate each plaintiff according to the true harm suffered—that rationalizes the restoration damage
measure. It would also create excessive deterrence.89 Instead, in order to
maintain a level of compensation close to the actual harm suffered, and
in order to guarantee that the Sincere receives full restoration damages,
a menu of remedies must be offered so that some pooling occurs.
Under the optimal sorting menu identiﬁed earlier, Sinceres always
receive full restoration damages and no money compensation. This sorting menu accomplishes the primary goal of the restoration damages
regime—to correctly compensate those who suffered the alleged emotional harm. In addition, under the optimal sorting menu, Fakers always
take some cash bounty and sort out, with no restoration ever ordered on
their behalf. The only complication arises with Intermediates. Depending on the relative intensity of their intermediate emotional harm, they
will either pool with the Sinceres or the Fakers. One way or another, such
pooling creates overcompensation—either too much restoration (if they
pool with the Sinceres) or too much monetary compensation (if they
pool with the Fakers).
c. Nonlinear Preferences. — The discussion above assumed that plaintiffs’ valuation of restoration and money damages exhibits a linear, or
constant, substitution rate. In other words, for any type of plaintiff, one
dollar of restoration is equivalent to a dollars of money, and the rate does
89. The deterrence concern could be overcome by reducing all remedies by the same
multiple. However, this would result in signiﬁcant undercompensation of some plaintiffs,
particularly Sinceres.
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not change across levels of restoration. If, for example, a = ½, the plaintiff values each additional $100 of restoration as $50 of money. This
linearity reﬂects an assumption that restoration of the underlying interest
has ﬁxed marginal returns—that every additional increment of restoration is equally valuable. But what if this assumption is wrong? What if
plaintiffs value the ﬁrst dollars of restoration more than the last? In
particular, if the ﬁrst dollars of restoration address the most critical harm
to the underlying interest, it is possible that each additional increment of
restoration would have positive but diminishing value.
If plaintiffs have nonlinear preferences, the hybrid option of damages (Option Two) becomes more desirable. Consider a case in which
full restoration would require restoration damages of $100. Assume, now,
that some Intermediates have nonlinear preferences. Speciﬁcally, imagine an Intermediate with average a = 0.6, but with a diminishing rate. For
the ﬁrst $50 of restoration, this plaintiff has a = 0.8; and for the second
$50 increment of restoration, the valuation falls to a = 0.4.
When a is ﬁxed at 0.6, we saw above that the lowest-cost menu would
have only two options: full restoration of $100 and money damages of $1.
The Intermediate would pool with the Sincere and choose the restoration damages.90 But now, a lower cost three-option menu is available for
the defendant. For example, the defendant may offer the following three
options:
(1) Full restoration of $100 and no money damages;
(2) Restoration of $50 and money damages of $21;
(3) Money damages of $22.
A Sincere with a = 1 would choose Option One, whereas a Faker with
a = 0 would choose Option Three. If the Intermediate had a ﬁxed a = 0.6,
she would pool with the Sincere and choose Option One. But with
diminishing a, she is best off choosing Option Two. Under Option Two,
because restoration is equal to $50, the Intermediate would have a = 0.8,
which would provide her with utility of 0.8 × $50 + $21 = $61. This is more
than the $60 she can get under Option One. And this three-option menu
reduces the cost to the defendant.91
Thus, with nonlinear preferences, the least-cost damages scheme
involves ﬁner separation of plaintiff types, with each type selecting a
different combination in the menu of restoration and money options.
Because some plaintiffs greatly value only partial restoration, such partial
restoration remedial options, coupled with some money, become part of
the least-cost restoration scheme. The analysis above demonstrates that
90. Under the assumption that each type of plaintiff is equally likely to be present,
the total cost to the defendant of this two-option menu would be $100 + $100 + 1 = $201.
91. Under the assumption that each type of plaintiff is equally likely to be present,
now the total cost to the defendant of the three-option menu would be $100 + $71 + 22 =
$193.
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the optimal remedy structure must contain combinations of restoration
and money. The next section discusses the feasibility and implementation
of these seemingly complex schemes.
3. Implementation. — At this point, many readers may think that the
construction of an election-of-remedy mechanism would be a daunting
task for courts. We saw that even with only two types of plaintiffs, the
design becomes quite complex, as courts have to determine the optimal
bounty for nonsincere plaintiffs. In reality, plaintiffs vary along a continuum, further complicating the challenge. Moreover, adding to the complexity, plaintiffs’ preferences for combinations of money and restoration
may be nonlinear, which requires even more information to design a
scheme that would compensate plaintiffs at the least cost.
It is unrealistic but unnecessary to expect courts to have the necessary
information to construct the sorting mechanism. To simplify the implementation, courts do not need to design the entire remedial menu. It may
be enough for courts to establish a single-option restoration remedy and
let the defendant design, in its shadow, a more complete opt-out menu.
Under this simplified scheme, the court could set one remedy for emotional harm—full restoration damages and no money damages. The
defendant could then offer as many opt-out combinations as it wishes.
The defendant might offer only one other option—for example, a small
money award that would pool the Fakers and some Intermediates away
from the restoration remedy. Or, the defendant may have better information about the distribution of the plaintiffs’ preferences and thus offer
different, perhaps more than two, remedial options. The advantage, of
course, is to remove the burden of constructing the menu from the court
and to place it on a party that has the right incentive to design it optimally. The defendant would naturally offer a menu of options that minimizes the total cost of liability. As long as full restoration is one of the
options—and that is the only constraint the court must supervise—there
is no risk that any plaintiff would be undercompensated. Under those
circumstances, overcompensation and overdeterrence are the only concerns, and the defendant’s efforts to mitigate this excess is desirable.92
While the court may delegate to the defendant the design of the
menu of remedies, it should not delegate the determination of what the
underlying interests are and what forms of in-kind restoration are
adequate. The defendant would have an incentive to offer restoration of
irrelevant interests, so as to channel plaintiffs to take the less costly
money damage option in the menu. We discussed the possibility that
plaintiffs might differ with respect to their injured underlying interests.
In such scenarios, the court should identify several possible harmed
interests and select the appropriate restoration for each. But, as
92. See infra sections IV.A–.B (explaining that with the sorting mechanism proposed
here, all plaintiffs will be either fully compensated or overcompensated, which might
result in overdeterrence).

2018]

THE RESTORATION REMEDY IN PRIVATE LAW

1929

recognized above, such assessment tasks are not simple, and it is entirely
possible that some emotional harms are so difficult to restore that they
will have to be overlooked. But so long as the court feels comfortable that
a particular restoration strategy is a plausible response to an alleged emotional harm, it should establish this strategy as the restoration damages
option and allow parties to sort in or out of it. The critical simpliﬁcation
step is to leave the design of other remedial options, which include less (or
no) restoration and some quantum of money damages, to the defendant.
C.

Renegotiation, Settlements, and Side Deals

The discussion so far examined the design of restoration damages in
court. The previous section argued that a sorting mechanism could overcome strategic behavior by plaintiffs faking the magnitude of their emotional harm. But parties also interact outside of court and may negotiate
around the restoration remedy and reach settlements. Parties negotiate
pretrial settlements, of course, in the shadow of the court, and these settlements reﬂect hypothetical trial outcomes. But they also create new
strategic opportunities that may affect the remedial outcomes. Moreover,
renegotiation can take place after trial, when plaintiffs could try to sell
their restoration rights to defendants after making their choices under
the election-of-remedy scheme.
This section examines whether renegotiation and settlement outcomes continue to deliver the payoffs characterized above. Section II.C.1
considers post-trial renegotiations, asking how their dynamics might affect
the sorting of plaintiffs. Section II.C.2 then looks at the far more common
pretrial settlements and asks whether the restoration remedy’s sorting of
plaintiffs is reﬂected in those bargains. Finally, section II.C.3 discusses the
potential effect of side payments offered to plaintiffs by third parties who
have stakes in the litigation’s outcome.
1. Post-Trial Renegotiation. — A key aspect of the restoration remedy is
the separation of sincere and fake claims, which could be done though a
sorting menu. But this desirable separation may be undermined by posttrial renegotiation. If plaintiffs expect to be able to renegotiate the remedy, Fakers would no longer take the money bounty. They would prefer
to choose full restoration, which is always the most burdensome option
for the defendant. Once this option is chosen, they would try to “extort”
the defendant and extract large settlements for waiving the awarded
restoration remedy. This possibility might suggest that it would be necessary for the law to bar postjudgment settlements in which the plaintiff, in
return for a side payment, waives the right to restoration and releases the
defendant from the obligation to restore.
Postjudgment waiver by plaintiffs of the restoration remedy is different from prejudgment waiver through the election-of-remedy mechanism. Even though plaintiffs can opt for money damages in court, they
should not be allowed to do so in a post-trial settlement. The reason, in a
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nutshell, is the greater bargaining power plaintiffs might enjoy post-trial.
In court, when the judge supervises the bargain, it is easier for the
defendant to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which would make it impossible for Fakers to hold the defendant up, particularly if they cannot later
renegotiate the remedy.93 Outside of court, any outcome is possible,
including settlements that provide recovery greater than the loss. Fakers
would be able to extract settlements that come closer to the cost restoration imposes on the defendant, rather than the emotional harm that they
truly suffered.
But the risk of such postjudgment extortion should not be exaggerated. A defendant who suspects that the plaintiff derives low value from
restoration would not be easily held up. In the same way that the defendant could induce plaintiffs to opt out in court, it could induce such opt
out postjudgment by making take-it-or-leave-it offers from the same menu.
Still, the likelihood of post-trial renegotiation not supervised by the court
might encourage Fakers to act strategically in court and choose restoration
damages in the hope of later selling them back. If so, and to the extent
possible, postjudgment waivers of the remedy should be barred.
Prohibitions against postjudgment settlements could be easily enforced
in class actions. There, it would be hard to hide side agreements from
other litigants, the public eye, and the courts, and particularly from
experienced class action objectors.94 The court could simply prohibit
such side deals and sanction violations by denying recovery altogether.
Furthermore, even without a straightforward prohibition on such
settlements, defendants might ﬁnd it in their best interest to agree with
the plaintiffs’ attorneys not to renegotiate after trial, knowing that breaching such a promise would be easily detectable and costly.
2. Pretrial Settlements. — In general, pretrial settlements reﬂect the
stakes at trial and help achieve the same expected remedial outcome
with lower litigation costs.95 But attorneys negotiate settlements, and the

93. See William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from
Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 790, 820–25 (2007) (exploring the ways in which courts can prevent class members from relitigating cases).
94. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, A Litigator Fights Class-Action Suits, Wall St. J. (Oct. 31,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/Essays/SB10001424052970203554104577002190221107960 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the work of the prominent class-action
objector Ted Frank); Class Action Fairness, Competitive Enter. Inst., https://cei.org/
issues/class-action-fairness [https://perma.cc/C9DG-DUXA] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018)
(describing the Center for Class Action Fairness at the Competitive Enterprise Institute,
one of the leading objectors to class action settlements); see also Edward Brunet, Class
Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. Chi. Legal
Forum 403, 416, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1337&
context=uclf [https://perma.cc/VX7H-H5BA] (explaining how, in some cases, experienced
objectors bring value to the suit by functioning as watchdogs).
95. See Kathryn E. Spier, Economics of Litigation, in 5 The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics 162, 162–64 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008)
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structure of attorney’s fees may shift the settlement outcome in systematic
ways.96 This concern is particularly relevant in class actions, in which
attorneys alone make the remedial choices for the plaintiffs, attorneys’
incentives drive the ﬁling of lawsuits and the outcome of settlements, and
the aggrieved parties have little active role to play.97
Before trial, the attorneys may agree with the defendants on the
design of the remedy selection scheme based on the structure of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. First, consider a fee contingent only on money damages
and not on restoration damages. Obviously, the attorney would be tempted
to settle for an award that maximizes total cash payments made to plaintiffs
rather than one that provides any restoration. The defendant would be
delighted to settle with the plaintiffs’ attorney for such payment, avoiding
the costlier restoration damages. This, of course, is not in the best interest
of class members as a whole. Put differently, while the Sinceres in the class
prefer the costlier restoration damages, both the defendant and the class
attorney share a preference for money damages, thus leaving those plaintiffs undercompensated (and the defendant underdeterred). In the same
spirit, the class action attorney and the defendant might agree on restoration avenues that are not fully compensatory and do not address the
true underlying interest, potentially channeling plaintiffs that otherwise
would have opted for restoration to elect the monetary damages option.
The reverse problem arises if the class action attorney’s fees are contingent on the total costs of the remedy to the defendant. Here, the attorney would prefer a settlement that maximizes restoration damages over
the (less costly) money damages, even if many or most members of the
class would have chosen money damages. The attorney has the incentive
to exaggerate the incidence and the magnitude of the emotional harm
and to prevent opt out by Fakers. Notice that despite this distorted incentive, class members are compensated in full and the only ones not happy
with full restoration are the Fakers, who lose the ability to extract money
payments above their actual harms. Still, the collapse of the election-ofremedy scheme and the attorney’s insistence on maximizing restoration
would lead to inefficient settlements that cost the defendant too much.
If courts are attentive to these conﬂicts, they may seek independent
evaluations to determine whether the restoration avenues agreed upon
(discussing how “parties can avoid their litigation costs . . . and the risk premium associated with trials”).
96. See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377, 1390–91 (2000) (describing the problem with a “sweetheart” settlement, in which “the defendant and the class
counsel have a joint incentive to negotiate a settlement that gives the class counsel a generous attorney’s fee, but gives the class members less than the fair value of their claims”).
97. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1315–19 (2006) (exploring the
incentive dynamics between class counsel, named plaintiffs, and unnamed plaintiffs in
class action litigation).
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in the settlement secure full compensation to plaintiffs. Alternatively,
courts may restrict the means of calculating attorney’s fees by awarding
fees that reﬂect the success of accomplishing the dual goals of restoration
and plaintiff choice.98 Still, the addition of an agency problem in the
representation of a diverse class complicates the impact of restoration
damages on the different types of plaintiffs.99 It is only weakly reassuring
that this agency problem afflicts all private law remedies.100
Still, the dynamics of pretrial settlements with class action attorneys
may sometimes simplify rather than complicate the award of accurate
restoration damages. Instead of individualized choice by class members,
the settlement could simply award all class members identical proportional
restoration damages, reﬂecting the proportion of sincerely harmed plaintiffs. To illustrate, imagine a class that consists of 100 plaintiffs, each
claiming emotional harm that would cost $1,000 to repair via restoration
damages for each sincere plaintiff. But not all plaintiffs are sincere.
Assume that forty percent of the plaintiffs are sincere and the remaining
sixty percent are fakers. At trial, an election-of-remedy menu might
successfully separate the plaintiffs, with the forty sincere plaintiffs choosing a $1,000 restoration damages option and the sixty fakers choosing a
small cash bounty. In all, the defendant would pay $40,000 for restoration plus a small additional sum of money damages. A settlement can do
better: The plaintiffs’ attorney and the defendant may agree to global
restoration damages of $40,000—forty percent of the total emotional
damages claimed—reﬂecting the true proportion of sincere claims. The
total amount of restoration under the settlement would equal the total
98. Courts have designed two basic methods for calculating attorney’s fees: the percentage-of-recovery method and the lodestar method. The percentage-of-recovery method is
“generally favored in cases involving a common fund, and is designed to allow courts to
award fees from the fund ‘in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it
for failure.’” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333 (3d
Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995)). On the other hand, the lodestar method is “applied in
statutory fee-shifting cases, and is designed to reward counsel for undertaking socially
beneﬁcial litigation in cases where the expected relief has a small enough monetary value
that a percentage-of-recovery method would provide inadequate compensation.” Id.
Regarding cy pres distributions in class action settlements, modern courts have
expressed concern that when the “selection of cy pres beneﬁciaries is not tethered to the
nature of the lawsuit and the interests of the silent class members, the selection process
may answer to the whims and self interests of the parties, their counsel, or the court.”
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011).
99. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Conﬂicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An
Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. Chi. Legal Forum 581, 581–82, https://
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1340&context=uclf [https://
perma.cc/46HU-VFFH] (explaining why class action litigation is particularly vulnerable to
conﬂicts of interest between the class and class counsel and how standard approaches do
not resolve these issues).
100. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 301
(1998) (exploring a lawyer’s various agency relationships and their legal consequences).
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amount of restoration damages under the sorting mechanism at trial, but
the bounty would be saved. Thus, in class actions alleging emotional
harm from injury to a jointly consumed good, the recovery for emotional
harm would be whole despite the absence of speciﬁc vindication—
namely, the fact that restoration is not speciﬁcally earmarked to the
suffering of any individual plaintiff.
3. Side Deals. — A different pretrial concern is the intervention of
third parties who care about the underlying impaired interest and who
might try to influence class members’ choices under the restoration scheme.
When the underlying impaired interest is a public good, third parties with
the strongest preference in securing this interest are eager to have
plaintiffs choose restoration damages over money damages and might pay
them to do so. Fakers, and even Intermediates with moderate concern for
the impaired interest, would welcome the opportunity for such side deals,
as long as the side payments from the third party exceed the value of the
cash or hybrid remedy they expect to get at trial.
Consider again the Volkswagen emissions case that involved harm to
the environment, and imagine the impact of side deals.101 Environmental
groups might offer payments to plaintiffs who suffered small or no
emotional harm and who are planning to choose a small monetary
payment over the costlier restoration damages. The environmental groups
would ask those plaintiffs to choose the restoration damages option in
return for the side payments. The plaintiffs would ultimately receive the
same, or even greater, cash compensation. But the defendant would end
up paying more, after having to ﬁnance restoration damages to a larger
fraction of the plaintiffs. As a result, these side deals would raise the level
of damages beyond the harm caused to the legally recognized plaintiffs.
Therefore, such side deals should be prohibited, and the restoration
remedy should not be transferrable to third parties.
D. Scope of Application
Having now deﬁned the main features of restoration damages, this
section examines more precisely the remedy’s scope of application. Restoration damages are suited to addressing injuries that are hard to measure
and verify. They do so by identifying an intermediate underlying interest
and establishing an election-of-remedy scheme. This Essay focuses on
solving a prominent manifestation of this problem—claims for emotional
damages. But elements of its proposed approach could be applied to
other types of claims such as injunctions and speciﬁc performance,102
environmental clean-up, and corrective advertising in unfair competition
law. Giving a plaintiff the choice between an in-kind remedy and money
would guarantee that the in-kind remedy is directed toward only those
101. See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text (introducing the Volkswagen case).
102. For an interesting application of the election-of-remedy mechanism, see
Atkinson, supra note 14, at 20–24.
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who truly value it. Furthermore, deploying the concept of intermediate
underlying interest could help identify the most adequate in-kind result.
While the scope of application of restoration damages could stretch
beyond emotional harms, it is equally important to recognize areas in
which the restoration remedy would not be applicable in addressing emotional harms. The main limiting criterion could be the presence or
absence of an intermediate underlying interest susceptible to various
means of advancement. Many of the examples used so far involved such
underlying interests. The environmental concerns of car buyers in the
emissions example could be easily satisﬁed by paying to reduce pollution.103 Likewise, when a seller warrants that food it sells is vegetarian,
kosher, or fairly traded, it may achieve restoration and cater to its clientele’s values by supporting animal welfare initiatives, paying for religious
services, or contributing to fair trade causes.104 There are many substitute
channels to restore these interests, and while picking the right one is not
always straightforward, it is a solvable problem.
There are, however, emotional harms that cannot be restored. For
example, it is hard to identify a way to restore the emotional harm from
the loss of sentimental memorabilia, and it is even harder to do so from
the loss of a loved one. There are indirect ways, perhaps, to accomplish some
relief for claimants—for example, through restoration damages directed at
the commemoration of the loss or education to prevent such future losses.
Still, the most straightforward applications of restoration damages are to
remedy emotional harms that arise from the aggrieved parties’ social or
moral concerns. Such concerns often relate to a jointly consumed good
like an interest in social justice or in the environment.105 These applications also create social benefits that likely exceed the social value of private
monetary damages because restoring jointly consumed goods derives
beneﬁts to third parties who value the same underlying interest.
Between the polar cases—the social harms that perfectly ﬁt restoration damages and the private loss of a loved one that is irreparable—lies
a continuum of settings in which restoration damages might work, albeit
imperfectly. Emotional harms arising from the impairment of underlying
private interests that have no communal aspect often fall into this intermediate category of imperfect fit. A consumer whose vacation trip was ruined

103. See supra text accompanying notes 3–12 (describing the Volkswagen emissions
example).
104. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (laying out the vegetarian example).
For the argument that the law should recognize consumers’ claims against sellers for
violating these types of warranties, see Katya Assaf, Capitalism vs. Freedom, 38 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 201, 261–65 (2014).
105. In a thoughtful new paper, Sarah Dadush refers to this category of injuries as
“identity harms.” She develops a framework to make such harms recoverable under existing remedial doctrines and considers, in passing, a version of restoration damages.
Dadush, supra note 65, at 924.
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by the hotel’s breach of contract106 and a homeowner whose aesthetic
enjoyment was diminished due to faulty construction both suffer
emotional harm.107 Standard monetary remedies, such as restitution of
the hotel charge or damages for the diminution of the home’s value, do
not make the aggrieved party whole. But the underlying interests—a
relaxing vacation or a tranquil home—are hard to restore because of the
veriﬁcation and measurement problems. Imperfect substitutes do exist,
though. The hotel could buy the plaintiff a substitute trip, and the developer could remedy the construction, however costly these options are.
Although these are simply different ways to compensate for expectation
damages, they are founded on the logic of restoration damages: The way
to make the aggrieved party whole is to undo the harm to the underlying
interest. And the sorting mechanism developed above would allow the
restoration remedy in these cases to sincere plaintiffs only.
E.

Doctrinal Similarities

Like many novel concepts, the restoration remedy builds on ideas and
practices that already exist in various pockets of law. This section traces the
DNA of restoration damages in other remedial doctrines of private law,
demonstrating the broad cross-substantive appeal of its underlying method.
Spotting the flickers of the basic idea of restoration damages—of requiring
wrongdoers to restore an intermediate underlying interest—helps broaden
the damages’ appeal and also provides a unified conceptual foundation to
the below-discussed scattered, seemingly unrelated, remedies.
1. Cy Pres Distributions in Class Actions. — Class action recovery often
faces the practical problem of identifying the class members and distributing damages to them, especially when the harm to each member of the
class is small.108 Cy pres distributions present a possible solution. These are
settlement awards for the indirect benefit of the class, usually to third-party
106. See Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 371 (Haw. 1972) (determining that a
hotel that refused accommodations to plaintiffs because it lacked available space and then
transferred plaintiffs to a hotel of lesser quality did not owe additional punitive damages for
breach of contract); Miles Brignall, Holiday from Hell? How to Claim Compensation,
Guardian (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/sep/06/holiday-hellcompensation-claim-summer-break [https://perma.cc/KN3D-NYNF] (explaining the challenges involved in valuing loss of enjoyment when making claims against vacation hotels).
107. See B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667, 672 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing the
mental anguish to future homeowners resulting from the breach of a building contract).
108. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir. 2012) (ﬁnding that
“it would be ‘burdensome’ and inefficient to pay the . . . funds that remain after costs
directly to the class because each class member’s recovery under a direct distribution
would be de minimis” (quoting Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 955 (9th Cir. 2003))); Klier v.
Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475 n.15 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In large class actions,
substantial administrative costs attend the distribution of settlement funds. As the settlement funds are disbursed and the amount still available for distribution . . . declines, . . .
the marginal cost of making an additional pro rata distribution to the class members
exceeds the amount available for distribution.”).
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recipients whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by
the class.109 Courts approve settlements that contain cy pres distributions
only when individual distributions are not viable.110 Cy pres, which is used
quite sporadically, was not designed and is not used for repairing emotional
harm. Rather, it seeks to resolve the problem of allocating settlement
distributions.111
Like cy pres, restoration damages rely on the existence of an underlying impaired value targeted for restoration. But unlike cy pres, which
directs the residual settlement not claimed by individuals toward societal
goals, restoration damages compensate for the emotional harm. When a
claim for emotional harm is made, individual monetary remedies are
often viable. Thus, as a matter of current doctrine, cy pres would not be
available. Yet it is precisely in this core case that restoration damages
should be preferred to direct compensation.
Moreover, because the restoration damages scheme is designed primarily to redress emotional harms, it may also operate in private harm
cases litigated as individual suits, when cy pres does not apply. A restoration damages scheme also has to deal with a problem that cy pres ignores:
distinguishing sincere claimants from fakers. Unlike cy pres distributions,
109. See generally Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.07 (Am. Law Inst.
2010) (“A court may approve a settlement that proposes a cy pres remedy even if such a
remedy could not be ordered in a contested case . . . [unless] individual class members
can be identiﬁed through reasonable effort.”). For examples of uses of cy pres, see In re
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2005) (addressing victims of
Nazi looting by approving an allocation of $100 million to beneﬁt Holocaust survivors);
Bruno v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (concerning
allegations of unlawful ﬁxing of milk prices in which the plaintiffs sought, inter alia,
lowering of milk prices in the affected area); McDonald’s Settlement, supra note 80, at 9–
10 (detailing a settlement in a class action suit alleging that McDonald’s mixed beef
ﬂavoring into its French fries despite claiming that the fries were vegetarian, in which
McDonald’s agreed to: (1) apologize to all Hindu and vegetarian clients, and (2) pay $10
million to speciﬁed nonproﬁt organizations); Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An
Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96 Yale L.J. 1591, 1598 n.44, 1599 n.49, 1600
n.53 (1987) (giving case examples).
110. In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“To be sure, cy pres-only settlements are considered the exception, not the rule.”); see also
Klier, 658 F.3d at 474–75 (explaining that direct distributions to class members are preferable because “[t]he settlement-fund proceeds, having been generated by the value of the
class members’ claims . . . are the property of the class”).
111. The precise contours of the cy pres doctrine remain unsettled. For example,
although courts agree that cy pres designations are appropriate only when (1) further
distributions to class members are not feasible and (2) the cy pres designee bears some
relationship to the original class, the extent of the necessary relationship is the subject of a
circuit split. Compare Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he cy pres doctrine allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable
portions of a class action settlement fund to the ‘next best’ class of beneﬁciaries”), with In
re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 3d 845, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (refusing to adopt
what the court considered to be the excessive “next best” standard, and instead adopting
the “reasonably approximate” standard because it better preserves the court’s ability to
oversee the administration and allocation of settlement funds).
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which are awarded to the class as a whole, the restoration damages scheme
must therefore involve the additional step of electing a remedy to screen
types of plaintiffs.
Cy pres raises fundamental questions about the authority of courts to
select nonlitigants as the recipients of court-awarded damages. Scholars
have argued that “[a]warding ‘damages’ to an uninjured third party
effectively transforms the court’s function into a fundamentally executive
role, . . . presid[ing] over the administrative redistribution of wealth for
social good. As a result, the practice violates both the constitutional
separation of powers and the case or controversy requirement of Article
III.”112 Arguably, similar concerns could be raised against the restoration
remedy proposed in this Essay.
Powerful as the constitutional challenge to cy pres may be, it likely
does not extend to the restoration remedy. A crucial difference between
the two remedies looms: Cy pres has no ambition to cure the harm suffered by the speciﬁc plaintiffs. It aims instead to bolster a set of values
and interests related to that harm. The restoration remedy, in contrast,
compensates for the direct harm—at least the emotional component of
it—suffered by the standing plaintiffs. It does not intend to “redistribute[e] . . . wealth for social good” nor “transform[] the court’s function
into a fundamentally executive role.”113 Because the court must focus on
curing the harm done to the plaintiff, its discretion is limited by the goal
of restoring the underlying interest of that plaintiff.
2. Societal Damages. — In her seminal article Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages, Professor Catherine Sharkey proposes a tort remedy that

112. Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class
Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 642 (2010); see also Klier,
658 F.3d at 480–82 (Jones, C.J., concurring) (expressing concern that cy pres distributions
may violate Article III standing requirements and suggesting that courts avoid the problem
by returning excess funds to the defendant); Robert E. Draba, Student Article, Motorsports
Merchandise : A Cy Pres Distribution Not Quite “as Near as Possible,” 16 Loy. Consumer L.
Rev. 121, 124 (2004) (expressing concerns about cy pres distributions to charitable
organizations that do not advance interests closely related to those of the injured class
members); John Goodlander, Note, Cy Pres Settlements: Problems Associated with the
Judiciary’s Role and Suggested Solutions, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 733, 733–34 (2015) (identifying
two potential legal problems with cy pres); Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class
Action Settlements, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1014, 1017 (arguing that discretion afforded
to judges in making cy pres distributions often results in distributions that are arbitrary
and unpredictable). Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged the questionable constitutional
foundations of cy pres distributions in the statement respecting the denial of certiorari in
Marek v. Lane and noted “fundamental concerns surrounding the use of such remedies in
class action litigation, including when, if ever, such relief should be considered” and “what
the respective roles of the judge and parties are in shaping a cy pres remedy.” 134 S. Ct. 8, 9
(2013). Justice Roberts suggested that “[i]n a suitable case, this Court may need to clarify
the limits on the use of such remedies.” Id.
113. Redish et al., supra note 112, at 642.
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resembles restoration damages.114 Sharkey noticed that some courts
award punitive damages but, to avoid overcompensating plaintiffs, direct
some of the money to charities and other entities that promote societal
goals related to the plaintiffs’ impaired interests.115 Sharkey’s article thus
proposes a new category of damages—“societal damages”—awarded as
part of a private tort suit to nonplaintiffs.116 These damages are awarded
either to victims of the same wrongdoing who are not before the court,117
or to the advancement of societal interests impaired by the wrongdoing.118
In this manner, societal damages transform punitive damages that otherwise overcompensate their recipients into compensatory damages and
thereby reach the larger penumbra of adversely affected parties and
interests.119
The practice of directing some punitive damages to nonplaintiffs,
and, more broadly, Sharkey’s proposal for societal damages, could lead to
the same results prescribed by restoration damages. Theoretically, both
societal and restoration damages rely on the concept of an underlying
impaired interest as the fundamental object of remedial concern. Both
require damages to be paid not directly to the plaintiffs but instead to
other parties. And, practically, both are ripe for application in situations
in which the impairment is to jointly consumed goods. But the two
remedies differ in three important dimensions.
First, a major goal and the most common application of societal
damages is to compensate victims not before the courts in the traditional
way of monetary compensation, often through funds.120 In contrast,
restoration damages apply an entirely different concept: The plaintiffs or
others injured by the wrongdoing are not paid any money directly. They
are made whole not via money damages but through the restoration of
the impaired underlying interest that accounts for their emotional harm.
Second, societal damages address a different problem than restoration damages. They address tort injuries to a large diffuse group. Restoration damages, in contrast, address the problem of emotional harms in
private law generally. They apply to private harms, breach of contract,
and jointly consumed goods that are not societal, in addition to societal
harms. But because they seek to repair emotional harm, they have to
resolve challenges that societal damages can largely ignore: the problems
of verification and measurement of the specific victims’ harms. They must
therefore contain a sorting mechanism.

114.
(2003).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347
Id. at 372–75.
Id. at 389–91.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 391–402, 420–22.
Id. at 400–02.
Id. at 389–91.
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Third, societal damages view “society” as the victim and seek to repair
harms to the public even when there is no recognized harm to any individuals.121 Accordingly, Sharkey proposes that damages be paid to the state
or other entities to promote the interests of the public.122 Restoration
damages, in contrast, allow for societal application only as the aggregate
sum of private harms. When no one suffers any harm, tangible or intangible, present or latent, there is no social harm. Therefore, restoration
damages seek to compensate victims for their private, in particular, emotional harms.123 These different goals translate into different means:
Societal damages are directed to restore societal interests, whereas restoration damages compensate specific plaintiffs and restore exactly the
underlying interests that gave rise to the plaintiffs’ emotional harms.
3. Distributions to Charities in Criminal Proceedings. — Courts have
occasionally ordered criminal defendants to make direct payments to
charities that support causes related to the interest injured by their
crime. While judges’ authority to order such awards is controversial and
may be limited by judicial codes of conduct,124 there is some indication
that if the charities chosen are directly related to the victims’ injured
interests, the awards would be permitted.125
Courts are generally empowered by criminal restitution statutes to
order cash payments to be made to the victims of the crime.126 Because
such payments can be directed only to actual victims, courts have sometimes adopted broad conceptions of the term “victim” under the statutes.127 Such expansive interpretations allow payments to redress the
121. See id. at 413–14.
122. Id.
123. This Essay does not intend to enter the debate about whether some interests
should be restored, even in the absence of private harms, such as in cases of environmental future harms. Rather, it seeks to explore how to compensate harms to actual victims
that currently go uncompensated. For the debate over victimless torts, see Ariel Porat &
Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm, in Perspectives on Causation 221, 233–38 (Richard
Goldberg ed., 2011) (supporting the creation of a negligence-based liability standard for
risk of future illness even when potential victims suffer no present physical harm).
124. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 1 So. 3d 425, 436–38 (La. 2009) (affirming the state judiciary commission’s recommendation of disciplinary action against a judge who engaged in
a pattern of ordering defendants in the drug court to pay ﬁnes to third-party charitable
organizations that didn’t meet the requirements to receive such assessments).
125. See, e.g., People v. Burleigh, 727 P.2d 873, 874–75 (Colo. App. 1986) (requiring
that a defendant who was found guilty of unlawful dispensing of a controlled substance not
in the course of a professional practice make a $5,000 contribution to a drug-treatment
program).
126. See, e.g., Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012)
(requiring courts to order defendants convicted of certain offenses to pay restitution to
victims).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 665 F.3d 1239, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2011) (ﬁnding that victims of uncharged fraudulent transactions were “victims” under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act); United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
that a university qualiﬁed as a “victim” under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act in the
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harm to the underlying impaired interest in the same way that restoration damages do.
Finally, criminal cases brought by the federal government against
large banks in the aftermath of the 2008 mortgage crisis routinely conditioned plea bargains and deferred prosecution agreements on defendants’ agreement to pay third-party charitable organizations dedicated to
affordable housing,128 such as Habitat for Humanity and the National
Urban League.129 The practice might be regarded as controversial because
some of the charities had concrete agendas that did not overlap with the
populations directly harmed by the banks’ actions. Indeed, the U.S.
Attorney General eventually cut off the prosecutorial discretion to enter
into such settlements and create restorative “slush fund[s].”130 He explained that “[t]hese third-party organizations were neither victims nor
parties to the lawsuits.”131
These occasional forms of redress in criminal proceedings resemble
the approach of restoration damages, even though they target a different
problem than emotional harm. Judges and prosecutors are looking for
ways to direct some of the defendants’ wealth to restore the harm done
to victims of crime or to other societal interests. Restitution awards aim,
in part, to achieve personal restorations. And distributions to charities in

prosecution of a senator for fraud and bribery); United States v. Wright, 496 F.3d 371, 380
(5th Cir. 2007) (allowing restitution to a victim injured by the same broad scheme, albeit
not the one for which the defendant was convicted); Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 46
(Colo. 2009) (en banc) (authorizing restitution payments to the county government when
a police officer responding to a radio call crashed on the way to the scene of a crime); cf.
State v. Silbaugh, No. 2008-P-0059, 2009 WL 819372, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2009)
(ﬁnding that a trial court may order a defendant convicted of animal cruelty to pay restitution to the Animal Protection League when the defendant stipulated to the restitution
order at the hearing). But see United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1996) (ﬁnding that the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 is “not so broad that it permits a
district court to order restitution to anyone harmed by any activity of the defendant”).
128. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion
in Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading Up to and During the
Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665billion-historic-justice-department-settlement-financial-fraud-leading [https://perma.cc/MJ8EK8W9]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $7
Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading Investors About Securities
Containing Toxic Mortgages ( July 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-7-billion-global-settlement [https://
perma.cc/A83N-44ME].
129. See Sari Horwitz, Sessions Prohibits Settlement Agreements that Donate Money
to Outside Groups, Wash. Post (June 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/sessions-prohibits-settlement-agreements-that-donate-money-to-outsidegroups/2017/06/06/c0b2e700-4b02-11e7-bc1b-fddbd8359dee_story.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
130. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a memo from Attorney General
Jeff Sessions).
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certain criminal cases are designed to repair the underlying interest injured
by the defendant.
III. APPLICATION: THE VOLKSWAGEN CASE RECONSIDERED
Part II argued that restoration damages address the measurement
and veriﬁcation problems of emotional harm, which Part I argued have
signiﬁcantly limited the availability of emotional recovery. Part III now
offers a demonstration. Returning to the case that inspired this Essay—
Volkswagen’s “dieselgate” emissions breach—this Part asks how a restoration damages regime would have resolved the dispute. It shows that the
actual resolution of the case reﬂects some of the principles of restoration
damages but in a manner that could be greatly improved.
A.

The Settlement

Recall that the Volkswagen case132 involved hundreds of thousands of
cars that Volkswagen sold in the United States with the certiﬁed assurance that they were low emitters, even though it knew these vehicles emitted nitrogen oxides forty times over the permitted limit.133 The numerous
class actions were consolidated into a single multidistrict litigation.134
Guided by a resourceful judge, the parties quickly reached a settlement.
Under its main component, Volkswagen agreed to pay consumers up to
$10 billion in money damages, reﬂecting the decline in the cars’ market
value.135 In addition, it agreed to invest $2 billion over ten years to
promote the use of zero emissions vehicles and $2.7 billion over three
years to reduce the excess nitrogen oxides emissions.136 Regarding the
latter two components, the court indicated that “[t]hese efforts address
the environmental damage caused by Eligible Vehicles.”137 Aside from
these private law settlements, Volkswagen entered into a plea agreement
132. See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text.
133. See Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 2.
134. The litigation also considered claims ﬁled by federal and state government entities for violations of criminal and other public laws. The Environmental Protection Agency
sued under Sections 204 and 205 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7523–7524 (2012).
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012), and alleged violations of Section
5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). Additionally, the State of California, on behalf of
the People and the California Air Resources Board, sued for violations of the Consumer
Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2012), and various California state laws. See
Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 3–4 (demonstrating that the MDL combined all of
these federal actions with the consumer class action).
135. This amount is based on the unrealistic assumption that all consumers will prefer
the remedy most expensive for Volkswagen. See Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at
19 (“The Settlement requires Volkswagen to establish a Funding Pool in the amount of
$10.033 billion. This amount presumes 100% Buyback of all purchased Eligible Vehicles
and 100% Lease Termination of all leased Eligible Vehicles.” (citation omitted)).
136. See id. at 39–40.
137. Id. at 40.
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with the government and paid a $2.8 billion criminal ﬁne and an
additional $1.5 billion in civil penalties.138
The settlement offered plaintiffs two options to recover for the lost
pecuniary value of the car: (1) “Buyback”—Volkswagen buys the owner’s
vehicle at its prescandal price, or (2) “Fix”— Volkswagen fixes the owner’s
vehicle according to a plan approved by the EPA.139 The Buyback option,
designed to allow people to terminate their relationship with Volkswagen,
fell short of covering the full pecuniary loss. Because this option made use
of the prescandal retail value of cars in their actual used conditions, it
allowed Volkswagen to keep some of the fraudulently inﬂated value.140
Thus, more compensation was necessary in the settlement to make
car owners ﬁnancially whole. Such compensation was offered as an addon “restitution payment.” This additional component entitled each
owner to the greater of $5,100 or $3000 plus twenty percent of the vehicle’s value.141 What exactly this recovery intended to measure is not
entirely clear. If its intent was to ﬁx the shortfall in the Buyback option,
or to account for the hassle of the Fix option, the amount is excessive. In
light of the court’s acknowledgment that some damages needed to cover
the frustration suffered by environmentally conscious buyers,142 the
restitution payment is probably best understood as a crude compensation
for the emotional harm alleged by the plaintiffs.
B.

The Law

Had the case proceeded to trial, a pecuniary damage measure for
the lost value of the cars would have been awarded, likely resembling the
restitution payments in the settlement. But would the court have awarded
compensation for emotional harm? How would such emotional recovery
be measured? The parties to the settlement certainly expected some
emotional damages to be awarded, and their settlement reﬂected this
expectation. The “restitution payment” to the car owners went beyond
redress for pecuniary harm. And the hefty payment of almost $5 billion
toward emissions mitigation programs, which was entirely separate from
the criminal ﬁnes paid to the government, went directly to the environmental source of the emotional distress.
138. See Rule 11 Plea Agreement at 12–13, United States v. Volkswagen AG, No. 16-CR20394, 2017 WL 1425975 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2017), 2017 WL 1093308.
139. See Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 6.
140. To see why, imagine that the fraud raised the new or used price by twenty-ﬁve
percent relative to the postdetection level. Consider a car that would have cost $20,000
new and $12,000 used, but due to the fraud was priced, predetection, at $25,000 new and
$15,000 used. Buyers of the new car overpaid $5000, but under the buyback they would
receive only $3000 back (the car would be bought back at $15,000, which is $3000 over its
current market price). Effectively, Volkswagen would not be compensating owners for the
fraudulently inﬂated price of the portion of the car already consumed.
141. See Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 20.
142. See infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the court explicitly recognized the gravity of the emotional
harm when it approved the settlement. The court referred to the Federal
Trade Commission’s position that the settlement should “fully compensate[] victims of Volkswagen’s unprecedented deception,” and that compensation should cover “the value of the lost opportunity to drive an
environmentally-friendly vehicle.”143 The court recognized the dilemma
as follows:
[R]ecovery of [emotional] damages is less certain given that
“[t]he direct harm caused by the TDI engines’ nonconformity
was not to the vehicle owner—who obtained a vehicle that performed as expected—but to the public at large. Something could
be allowed on account of the owner’s frustration and inconvenience, but
recovery on this basis might be only modest.”144
Indeed, the underlying rationale of both the Buyback and the Fix
options recognized that a low-emission car is worth more than a highemission car to many consumers. Otherwise, why allow consumers to
withdraw from a deal (Buyback) or require in-kind repair (Fix)? Why not
award diminution-in-value damages exclusively? Such remedies are valuable to owners only if they also care about emissions. Recall that no federal
or state authority has declared the diesel cars illegal to drive,145 and
Volkswagen was already being separately punished for violating public
environmental laws.146 The private law settlement thus reﬂects an attempt
to redress more than the pecuniary loss.
An award of emotional damages in this case would have accurately
reﬂected the prevailing doctrine. Despite the general reluctance of contract law to award remedies for emotional harm, this case likely fell within

143. Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Federal Trade Commission’s Statement Supporting the Settlement at 1–2, In re
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2672 CRB
(JSC) (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
160726ftc-vw-statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4R8-DEVY]).
144. Id. at 16 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Expert Report
of Andrew Kull at 17, Volkswagen, No. MDL 2672 CRB (JSC) (ﬁled Aug. 26, 2016) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review)).
145. The EPA has stated it will not conﬁscate Eligible Vehicles and “[t]he 44 states
participating in the Attorneys General statement have also agreed to allow Class vehicles to
stay on the road pending participation in the Class Action Settlement.” See id. at 40 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion,
Motion, and Memorandum in Support of Final Approval of the 2.0-Liter TDI Consumer
and Reseller Dealer Class Action Settlement at 31, Volkswagen, No. MDL 2672 CRB (JSC)
(ﬁled Aug. 26, 2016) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)).
146. See, e.g., Nick Carey & David Shepardson, VW Pleads Guilty in Diesel Emissions Case
as Part of $4.3 Billion Settlement, Wash. Post, (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/vw-pleads-guilty-in-diesel-emissions-case-as-part-of-43-billion-settlement/
2017/03/10/3e91a9e4-05d1-11e7-b9fa-ed727b644a0b_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z6MDX2QJ].
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what courts regard as the “personal interest” category of transactions.147
The cars were marketed as low emitting not because such an attribute
serves an economic or commercial interest but rather to appeal to buyers’
personal, nonpecuniary, emotional satisfaction.148 It would be odd to
classify the emissions assurance as “incidental” and not deserving of
remedial protection given that it was a principal advantage sold to buyers
and had a substantial impact on the price of the vehicles.
A court would have found it more difficult to speculate as to the
amount of the emotional damages recovery. Existing doctrine is a black
box in that regard because it is asked to do the impossible—to put a
price tag on a loss that is deﬁned as nonpecuniary and incommensurable.149 As in the settlement, such recovery would likely have been crude
and invariant across plaintiffs. Sincere environmentalists and fakers alike
would have collected the same award. The duration of each plaintiff’s use
of the vehicle would likely not have factored into the award, even though
it surely affects the magnitude of the emotional harm.150
Unlike the settlement, it is hard to imagine that a court-set award would
have tried to remedy the emotional harm by requiring Volkswagen to
contribute billions of dollars toward emissions reduction. This strategy,
which directly restores the underlying interest, requires a different set of
doctrinal tools, which the restoration damages remedy would hopefully
provide. The next section thus brieﬂy demonstrates how restoration damages could be used in the Volkswagen case.
C.

Restoration Damages

If car owners suffered emotional harm, it is because their interest in
driving low-emitting vehicles was violated. The intermediate underlying
interest injured by the breach is thus straightforward: clean air. The longer
one owned and the more miles one drove the vehicle, the larger the gap
between the promised and the actual emissions it caused, and the graver
the injury to the underlying interest. Thus, each owner’s emotional harm

147. See Valentine v. Gen. Am. Credit, Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Mich. 1984)
(suggesting that courts may award damages for emotional distress arising from the breach
of contract when the primary purpose in forming the contract was “to secure protection of
personal interests”); see also supra text accompanying notes 34–35.
148. See Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 2 (“Volkswagen sold nearly 500,000
Volkswagen- and Audi-branded TDI ‘clean diesel’ vehicles, which they marketed as being
environmentally friendly . . . .”).
149. See, e.g., Valentine, 362 N.W.2d at 631 (denying mental distress damages for
breach of an employment contract); Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 53
(Mich. 1980) (noting the “difficulty of monetary estimation” of emotional harm); Zager v.
Dimilia, 524 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (Village Ct. 1988) (stating that the emotional bond between
a man and his pet is impossible to reduce to monetary terms).
150. Ironically, in the actual settlement, the restitution payments depended on usage
inversely: Cars with higher mileage had lower values, so their owners received lower
restitution payments. See Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 3, at 30.
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is derived from a single personalized quantity, measured by the excess
emissions her car ownership caused relative to the promised level.
Not only is it easy to measure and quantify the injury to the underlying interest of each individual plaintiff, it is also reliably easy to restore
the underlying interest. Volkswagen could be ordered to take actions that
reduce emissions to exactly offset the injurious increase. For each unit of
carbon that was emitted in excess of its promise to its customers,
Volkswagen could be required to accomplish a unit of reduced carbon.
Indeed, the settlement identiﬁed two possible emission-reduction strategies: invest in zero-emissions electric vehicle technology and establish an
emissions mitigation trust to reduce excess nitrogen oxides emissions.151
Other, more straightforward strategies, not tied to particular environmental causes, are also available. For example, Volkswagen could be ordered to
purchase but not use emissions permits in the amount of carbon dioxide
equal to the increase attributed to its deception. Or, the court could
establish the target amount of emissions reduction and let Volkswagen
choose a restoration strategy that meets this goal. This would elicit the
least-cost restoration.
Plaintiffs claiming to have suffered emotional damages due to the
emissions would see their underlying interest restored because their
ownership and driving of the car would now accomplish the personal
environmental goal promised under the contract. Since the goal was to
reduce emissions, it would now be fully satisﬁed. If all owners are sincere
about their claim of emotional harm, all would join this restoration remedy, and the sum total of restoration ordered would equal the sum total
of the excess emissions due to all the vehicles.
But not all owners are sincere. Thus, a key to the implementation of
the restoration damages is to sort out the fakers. The sorting mechanism
proposed in section II.B would entitle the defendant to offer opt-out
money damages, or some combination of partial restoration and money.
These alternatives would be cheaper for the defendant and more valuable
to the fakers or the semi-environmental plaintiffs.
The restoration remedy should not be scaled down in light of the
public remedies sought and obtained by the EPA and state regulators.
These ﬁnes increase deterrence but do not accomplish the remedial goal
of restoration damages because the money is not earmarked to redress
the underlying environmental interest. It might be that some car owners’
vexation and frustration would be soothed by the knowledge that the
wrongdoer is being ﬁned dearly. But this psychological-retributive sentiment is not the goal of the restoration remedy, and it does not reduce
the need to repair the underlying interest. For many owners, even full
restoration would not relieve the offense of being cheated, and it is
exactly this added sense of betrayal that the ﬁnes address.

151. See id. at 39–40.
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Moreover, even from a deterrence perspective, the ﬁnes paid to the
government do not justify a reduction of the private law restoration remedy. Rivers of ink have been spilled to justify larger damages for willful
breach, and this is not the place to reproduce the rationale.152 It is hard
to think of a breach more willful than that committed by Volkswagen, and
the ﬁnes paid to the government may well ﬁt the remedy multiplier
necessary to deter such willful transgressions.
IV. THE SOCIAL VALUE OF RESTORATION DAMAGES
The ﬁrst three Parts of this Essay described the proposed restoration
damages measure. Part I explained the problem, Part II the solution, and
Part III gave an example. The implicit goal of compensating as accurately
as possible sincere plaintiffs for the emotional harm they suffered guided
this entire discussion. This Part now addresses why it is important to accurately compensate emotional harms. The answer has an obvious core:
People are more fully compensated for their overall harm, and wrongdoers
are better deterred. If successful, the restoration remedy would advance
the two primary social goals of remedies—compensation and deterrence
of emotional harm—in a way unmatched by any other existing private
law remedy. This Part takes a closer look at these interests and the tradeoffs between them. It identifies two additional social benefits that the
restoration remedy may create: saving administrative costs and benefitting
third parties.
A.

Compensation

Restoration damages make plaintiffs who suffered emotional harm
whole if the court successfully identiﬁes the underlying impaired interest
and correctly measures the degree of restoration that would exactly offset
the harm. In the polluting car example, this measurement is straightforward—carbon-for-carbon. In the vegetarian food example,153 it is more
challenging to identify the interest and measure it, although errors of overand under-restoration could average out.
If the underlying interest is accurately identiﬁed and measured, no
plaintiff is left undercompensated. Those experiencing signiﬁcant emotional harm value the restoration greatly, and those with a weaker attachment to the underlying interest value the restoration proportionally less.
There is, however, a concern with overcompensation. As discussed in section II.B, the key to solving the problem of veriﬁcation is to separate the
sincere from the fakers through some payment of money damages to the

152. See infra note 159 (explaining that willful breaches often result in higher damages
awards compared to inadvertent breaches).
153. See supra text accompanying note 66 (noting that the motivations for reducing
meat consumption can vary from concerns about animal welfare to religious restrictions,
health-related motivations, or personal taste).
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fakers. Thus, some victims are compensated in full (with restoration),
while some nonvictims, or victims who suffered small emotional harms,
are overcompensated (with money).
Overcompensation is a problem that may afflict other remedies as
well, including conventional money damages. Ideally, if veriﬁcation and
measurement were feasible, a remedy of money damages would be superior to restoration damages in compensating victims because it would
result in neither under- nor overcompensation. But in the presence of
veriﬁcation and measurement difficulties, a remedy of pure damages
would undercompensate some victims and overcompensate others. We
thus cannot offer a general proposition on the superiority of either the
restoration remedy or money damages with respect to compensation. If
the overcompensation problem coming out of the election-of-remedy
scheme of restoration damages is severe, the scheme would perform
poorly.154
Note that the overcompensation could be fully resolved by eliminating the election-of-remedy mechanism altogether and requiring all plaintiffs to accept restoration damages. Here, no one is under- or overcompensated because fakers receive restoration damages that have no compensatory
value to them, and restoration damages achieve the exact quantum of
compensation for all plaintiffs better than any other remedy. But the
burden on the defendant would be greater, creating overdeterrence, as
the next section explains.
B.

Deterrence

Restoration damages can create overdeterrence for two reasons.
First, restoration might be more expensive than the emotional harm it
remedies. And second, fakers have to be paid off despite suffering no
harm. While both overdeterrence problems are possible, their scope seems
limited.
Speciﬁcally, to achieve optimal deterrence a defendant should bear
the least cost necessary to make the victim whole. Ideally, restoration
should be awarded only when its cost is less than the emotional harm it

154. Still, restoration damages have the advantage over conventional damages of
avoiding undercompensation, as long as the underlying interest is accurately identiﬁed
and measured. Therefore, if the legal system fears undercompensation more than
overcompensation, the scheme envisioned by this Essay would be superior to conventional
damages. Indeed, some commentators believe that as between faulty injurer and innocent
victim, the law should err on the side of overcompensating the victim. See, e.g., Jules L.
Coleman, Mental Abnormality, Personal Responsibility, and Tort Liability, in Mental
Illness: Law and Public Policy 107, 120–21 (Baruch A. Brody & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.
eds., 1980) (arguing that justice considerations favor the victim over the wrongdoer);
Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 468 (1992)
(quoting the previous argument).
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eliminates.155 Otherwise, if verification and measurement of the emotional
injury were perfect, money damages, rather than restoration, would provide
optimal deterrence. The restoration remedy is particularly appealing in
cases of high emotional harm because it is more likely that the cost of
restoration would be less than the emotional harm it cures.
Restoration damages could create overdeterrence even when they
are the least-cost measure to reduce high emotional harm—when fakers
are hard to identify and a bounty needs to be offered to sort them out. In
this Essay’s stylized two-plaintiff-type example, the bounty is nominal and
thus its deterrence distortion is negligible.156 But it is also true that when
plaintiff types vary, the bounty for separating the fakers can be substantial.157 True, the overdeterrence arising from this informational challenge could be corrected by scaling down the restoration remedy for all
plaintiffs, but this would in turn defeat the compensation goal underlying
the scheme.158
Ultimately, the problem of overdeterrence under the restoration
remedy is mitigated by several additional factors. First, when emotional
harm is low, plaintiffs are not motivated to sue, and when they are represented through a class action they are not motivated to redeem their
award. Such passivity might be an artifact of the present regime in which
the monetary recovery for emotional harm is low. Participation rates
might increase if the monetary bounties were higher.
Second, if overdeterrence leads to costly precautions, contractual
parties might be motivated to explicitly bargain ex ante over the extent
of emotional harm liability. People with low emotional stakes in the activity might contractually waive their right to recover restoration damages
for a discount. Like any remedy, the restoration measure would be a
default rule that can be disclaimed contractually. Even when its application is limited to contracts that have a “personal” element, parties with
low emotional stakes could opt out.
155. To be sure, an award of inefficient restoration could be renegotiated to avoid the
wasteful investment. Even then, however, the plaintiffs may extract settlements exceeding
their actual losses. See supra section II.C.1 (explaining why post-trial renegotiation might
be inefficient).
156. See supra section II.B.2 (discussing how the sorting mechanism works).
157. See supra section II.B.2.
158. Another overdeterrence problem could arise if victims choose restoration not
because they suffered severe emotional harm but because they are tempted by the opportunity to contribute to what they think to be a good cause. Thus, in the Volkswagen case, an
environmentalist who suffered emotional harm that is lower than the monetary payment
option offered to her under the restoration scheme might nevertheless choose the more
costly restoration option because she is tempted by the opportunity to contribute to the
environment. While not impossible, such behavior would likely not be widespread. More
realistically, third parties might offer money rewards to plaintiffs who choose restoration.
To avoid this overdeterrence problem, this Essay suggests that such arrangements
should be prohibited. See supra section II.C.3 (explaining why side deals reduce the effectiveness of our sorting mechanism).
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Third, if the emotional harm arises from an intentional and malicious
violation, overcompensation does not create overdeterrence because the
objective of remedies is to completely deter such conduct. Indeed, compensation in such willful harm cases usually exceeds actual harm to satisfy
this deterrence rationale.159 The Volkswagen example falls into the willful
breach category, and overcompensation is necessary to deter such hardto-detect violations.
C.

Administrative Costs

A distinct advantage of the restoration remedy, compared to conventional money damages, is simpliﬁed administration. The restoration remedy requires the same preliminary burden of classifying the injury as one
justifying recovery for emotional harm as the existing money damages
remedy. But it simpliﬁes the measurement and veriﬁcation tasks. The
main task for courts would be to determine what full restoration entails—
namely, what are the injured underlying interests and what forms and
magnitude of restoration would be adequate. This is not a trivial task, but
plaintiffs could help courts by self-reporting the interest allegedly
impaired. Since plaintiffs value restoration damages only if they truly value
that interest, they would have no interest in cheating. The court would still
have to determine whether the alleged injury is real. But the court would
not have to set the menu of remedial options since the defendant would
have the incentive to design it.
This procedure is less burdensome than the existing money award
litigation. Plaintiffs no longer have to prove their harm, and courts no
longer have to ﬁgure out how to translate emotional grievance into dollars. Under the present regime, courts sometimes standardize compensation by awarding a uniform measure of damages to all plaintiffs, based on
their average harm or some crude personalization by categorizing plaintiffs into several groups.160 But even with standardization, administrative
costs are likely to be high because it might be hard to calculate average
harms. Surveys of plaintiffs may create distorted accounts, and surveys
among the general population may not be representative.161

159. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful
Breach, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1479, 1481 (2009) (arguing that when a party is caught in the
act of willful breach, it is punished not merely for this act, but for the (probabilistically)
inferred mesh of bad conduct that came with it); Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful
Breach ‘Willful’?: The Link Between Deﬁnitions and Damages, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1501,
1507–08 (2009) (explaining why damages should be high in willful breach cases).
160. Thus, in most jurisdictions, damages for pain and suffering can be awarded on a
per diem basis measured from the time of the injury until the plaintiff’s end of life expectancy. See, e.g., Debus v. Grand Union Stores of Vt., 621 A.2d 1288, 1290 (Vt. 1993) (allowing per diem damages for pain and suffering).
161. See Viscusi, supra note 67, at 57–58 (observing “that interviews may not elicit
accurate responses because respondents have no incentive to give thoughtful or honest
answers”).
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Consider, for example, the burden of remedying emotional harm
arising from consumption of falsely labeled vegetarian food.162 Rather
than establishing an arbitrary money award (which would attract endless
fake claimants, thus requiring some costly veriﬁcation mechanism), the
court need only designate a restoration target that ﬁts the reported
impaired interest and the sum necessary to offset the wrong. The court
would identify, for example, an organization dedicated to vegetarian
causes (perhaps one proposed by the plaintiff) and the money necessary
to offset the harm to animals committed by the use of animal ingredients
in the food.
D. Third-Party Effects
Restoration of an underlying interest shared by others creates a public good, beneﬁtting all those who value the interest. Restoring an environmental resource or a religious symbol benefits all environmentalists or
members of the religious sect. This is an advantage that money damages
do not have. It is possible that an emotionally harmed recipient of money
damages would spend the award to restore an underlying interest shared
by others. But as long as some of the monetary awards are privately
consumed, they create no beneﬁt to others.
This advantage highlights the great attractiveness of restoration
damages in cases involving harm to public goods. Our discussion earlier
did not distinguish between emotional harms from injuries to public and
private interests. We now see that the case for restoration damages is
stronger in public interest cases. While restoration damages could also
remedy private harms (like a spoiled wedding celebration or a devastated
backyard163), it is only in the case of public harms that the third-party
effect augments the social value of the remedy. These third parties may
not have legally protected expectations, but they beneﬁt nevertheless.
The magnitude of the effect on third parties depends on another
aspect of the harm to the underlying interest: whether it accumulates
across victims. Some harms are lumpy. For instance, the destruction of a
religious symbol through tortious action or an oil spill affects many parties, including those who cannot sue for practical or legal reasons.164
Granting restoration to the active plaintiffs affects nonsuing parties and
might remedy their losses entirely. In such cases, restoration might be the
cheapest—and maybe the only—way to compensate all victims, regardless

162. See supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing possible reasons why people
avoid consuming meat).
163. See supra note 36 (mentioning cases in which current contract law allows recovery for emotional harm, including that resulting from defective services for weddings).
164. Liability might not be imposed for duty of care and proximate cause reasons. See
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical Harm and Emotional Harm § 29 (Am.
Law Inst. 2012) (adopting the term “scope of liability” to refer to what is commonly known
as “proximate cause”).
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of their participation in the lawsuit.165 It also creates optimal deterrence,
since the wrongdoer internalizes the entire social harm caused by his
wrongdoing.
In other cases, the harm is divisible and accumulates across victims.
Selling a polluting car model in the guise of environmental promises creates harms that add up as more people purchase the model. Here, the
only parties who are compensated are the suing plaintiffs. Third parties
who care about the environment are not recognized as victims or thirdparty beneﬁciaries, and are thus not entitled to restoration. Nevertheless,
they beneﬁt from the restoration remedy, in the same way that they beneﬁt from the nonbreached contracts of others.166
CONCLUSION
This Essay began with a puzzle: Why do emotional harms receive
such meager protection in private law? A possible reason is the misalignment between the emotional injuries plaintiffs suffer and the remedies
private law has in its arsenal. The two main reasons for this divergence
are the veriﬁcation and measurement problems. The absence of remedies to overcome these problems stops courts short of assigning liability.
This Essay offers a novel solution to the misalignment—a new private
law remedy of restoration damages. The remedy has a simple theoretical
foundation and requires little information to implement. Plaintiffs claiming emotional grievance have to identify the underlying interest, and the
court has to certify that the transaction or the violation indeed implicated
such interest. It is then up to the wrongdoer to offer a method for
restoration and to create an election-of-remedy menu to sort out sincere
plaintiffs from fakers. In various settings, the restoration remedy has
advantages over the conventional monetary damages remedy: It better
compensates, better deters, saves administrative costs, and creates benefits
to third parties not involved in the litigation.
While many of the cases that motivated our analysis involved emotional harms arising from people’s interest in the integrity of public
goods like the environment, the proposed restoration remedy could also
be applied to more traditional settings with a single wrongdoer inﬂicting
private harm on a single victim.
165. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 114, at 392–94 (explaining that “societal damages” should
compensate absent plaintiffs).
166. On a different perspective, in the Volkswagen case, Volkswagen committed a
wrong toward noncontractual parties since the actual emission was not only beyond what
the warranties guaranteed, but also beyond what the law allowed. Ideally, all victims, both
contractual and noncontractual, should get compensated even if this is practically and
legally impossible. Restoration compensates those victims as well. See discussion supra Part
III. Under this view, restoration should probably be mandatory, to offset the emotional
harm suffered by plaintiffs and nonplaintiffs alike. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 114, at 394–99
(explaining that “societal damages” should compensate “quasi-plaintiffs,” who “in and of
themselves, do not amount to legally cognizable injuries”).
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In an economy increasingly focused on products that provide emotional rather than physical benefits, sellers’ promises to deliver emotionally
satisfying experiences have to be backed up with a legal infrastructure
supporting the expectations they create. Public law and nonlegal enforcement norms have made significant adjustments to protect the growing
domain of emotional expectations. For private law to do its share, new
remedies specially designed to address emotional harms are needed. The
restoration damages measure developed in this Essay could ﬁll this timely
role.

